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The Myth of Free
John M. Newman*
ABSTRACT
Myths matter. This Article is the first to confront a powerful myth that
pervades modern economic, technological, and legal discourse: the Myth of
Free. The prevailing view is that consumers capture massive welfare surplus
from a flood of innovative new products that are offered free of charge. Econ-
omists, legal scholars, and industry stakeholders created an origin story-a
myth-to explain how these products became "Free."
But that orthodox origin story is fatally flawed. This Article formalizes,
then debunks, the Myth of Free and its underlying assumptions. The Myth is
riddled with internal inconsistencies, logical errors, and factual. inaccuracies.
In their place, this Article provides a revisionist history of Free, one that offers
greater descriptive and predictive accuracy. Along the way, it solves several
puzzles: Why has Free become the default online business model? Why does
the age of abundance-so often predicted-always fail to materialize? And
why is society nonetheless drawn to such predictions?
The task is urgent: the Myth of Free is not benign. It has misled courts
into granting protected legal status to Free-product suppliers in cases ranging
from contract disputes to antitrust and privacy litigation. It has also motivated
policy proposals that call for eliminating market interventions-or competitive
markets themselves-without adequate justification in either case. Moreover,
policies designed for a post-scarcity world necessarily overlook the persistent
problems attendant to scarcity, thereby creating substantial allocative ineffi-
ciencies. This Article seeks to dispel the Myth of Free before it can wreak
further harm to societal welfare and the rule of law.
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INTRODUCTION
"Free," in all of its many facets, is a powerful term. At a high
level, it can be disambiguated into two signifiers: "free" as in libre and
"free" as in gratis.' The former serves as a rallying cry for groups rang-
ing from civil-rights activists to anarchists, evoking cherished ideals
1 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FuruRE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CON-
NECTED WORLD 12 (2001).
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like freedom of speech and of the press. The latter, on the other hand,
is perhaps most beloved by marketers seeking to lure new customers. 2
And it is the latter usage, free-as-in-gratis, that has come to domi-
nate the discourse surrounding modern digital markets.3 Following the
explosive growth of internet-based products, a powerful myth arose-
the Myth of Free. According to this myth, the convergence of digitiza-
tion and networking ushered in a "New Economy" with new rules.4
Standard economics takes as a central principle the scarcity of
resources.5 Given scarcity, the allocation of resources becomes the
fundamental problem of economics. 6 In the popular view, the central-
ity of scarcity renders economics a cynical enterprise, the dismal sci-
ence. As early as 1938, "There ain't no such thing as [a] free lunch"7
(often denoted by the acronym "TANSTAAFL") encapsulated the lay
understanding of modern economics."
The ascendance of the New Economy, however, supposedly de-
stroyed that fundamental principle. In 2009, Chris Anderson, then Ed-
itor-in-Chief of WIRED magazine, published Free, a book that has
become one of the leading texts in the Myth of Free's canon.9 Free
claims that "[t]wenty-first-century Free is different from twentieth-
century Free.... Somehow an economy had emerged around Free
before the economic model that could describe it."lo The New Econ-
2 See generally David Adam Friedman, Free Offers: A New Look, 38 N.M. L. REV. 49, 72
(2008) ("Social and cognitive psychology explain the power of the word 'free' and may explain to
a certain extent the widespread use of the term in marketing.").
3 See, e.g., CHRIs ANDERSON, FREE: THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE 3 (2009) ("[T]his
'free' wasn't just a marketing gimmick like the free samples and prizes inside that we're used to
in traditional retail. This free ... wasn't just a lure for a future sale, but genuinely gratis.").
4 See, e.g., J. Bradford DeLong & Lawrence H. Summers, The 'New Economy': Back-
ground, Historical Perspective, Questions, and Speculations, FED. REs. BANK KAN. CITY ECON.
REv., Fourth Quarter 2001, at 29, 34-35; Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 925-26 (2001).
5 See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 17 (7th ed.
1967) ("[W]hile it recognizes the important germ of truth in the notion that America has become
an affluent society, economics must still contend with scarcity as a basic fact of life.").
6 See id. at 16-18.
7 Fred Shapiro, Quotes Uncovered: The Punchline, Please, FREAKONOMICS (July 16, 2009,
11:40 AM), http://freakonomics.com//2009/07/16/quotes-uncovered-the-punchline-please/ [https:/
/perma.ccl55KG-8GD5]; see also Economics in Eight Words, Prrr. PRESS, Mar. 13, 1958, at 16,
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1144&dat=19580313&id=jPoeAAAAIBAJ&sjid=EU
4EAAAAIBAJ&pg=7426,4042997&hl=en [https://perma.cc/Z7AK-QVUS].
8 See David R. Henderson, TANSTAAFL, There Ain't No Such Thing as a Free Lunch,
LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y 2Ol 4 /
Hendersontanstaafl.html [https://perma.cc/6RV5-JPST].
9 ANDERSON, supra note 3.
1o Id. at 3-4.
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omy (we are told) heralded an age of abundance that will render eco-
nomics-and capitalism-unnecessary. Another commentator, for
example, announces that "capitalism['s] ... once unchallenged prow-
ess is diminishing, making way for an entirely new way of organizing
economic life in an age characterized by abundance rather than
scarcity.""
Under this view, "Freeconomics" has replaced standard econom-
ics.12 The marginal costs of digital products supposedly fell to zero,
causing prices to follow. 3 Scarce goods are costly; abundant goods are
Free. And standard economics cannot account for Free. 14
Or so the story goes. The premises underlying the Myth of Free
have gone largely unchallenged-yet, under close scrutiny, those
premises exhibit fatal flaws. The new Freeconomics proves to be an
illusion. The New Economy signals neither the end of standard eco-
nomics nor the demise of capitalism.
This Article seeks to dispel the Myth of Free. Part I begins by
briefly describing both the standard account of Free's rise to promi-
nence and the recent scholarly predictions that Free will soon expand
beyond digital markets. Part II then formalizes into a syllogism the
sometimes imprecise claims underlying Freeconomics. While tempora-
rily withholding judgment on the accuracy of the premises, Part I con-
cludes that the syllogism's formal structure is valid.
Part II turns to the descriptive accuracy of the Myth's major and
minor premises. Those premises fail in any meaningful way to de-
scribe reality. First, the major premise-"marginal costs equal zero"-
ignores the persistence of costs and the scarce resources involved in
providing Free products. And because it depends on the supposed
ubiquity of an objectively irrational scheme, the most common varia-
tion of the major premise ("marginal costs are close to zero") also
lacks descriptive value. Second, by co-opting-and misusing-the
neoclassical theory of marginalism, the minor premise ("price equals
marginal cost") fails to describe the long-run functioning of Free mar-
kets. By incorrectly assuming that Free markets exhibit the economic
ideal of perfect competition, the minor premise falls short yet again.
Given its flawed premises, the Myth of Free unsurprisingly yields a
11 JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY: THE INTERNET OF THINGS, THE
COLLABORATIVE COMMONS, AND THE ECLIPSE OF CAPITALISM 9 (2014).
12 See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 13.
13 E.g., id. at 3.
14 See id. at 4 ("Somehow an economy had emerged around Free before the economic
model that could describe it.").
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flawed conclusion. "Free" products, this Article demonstrates, are not
free at all.
Part III takes up the task of revising Free's origin story. In place
of zero marginal costs and "too cheap to matter," Part III posits that
Free is the result of a combination of several factors: (1) early defects
in online-payments architecture; (2) the adoption of advertising, and
the derived demand for personal information, as the dominant online
business model; (3) the stubborn persistence of intellectual property
("IP") infringement as a zero-price substitute for legitimate, positive-
price content; (4) the Zero-Price Effect, an irrational consumer pref-
erence for zero-price products; and (5) the inherent difficulty consum-
ers experience in attempting to calculate nonprice attention or
information costs. Because the majority of these factors remain in ef-
fect, Free-based business models will likely continue to prevail in the
digital markets that lie at the core of the Myth of Free.
But Part III concludes that-although some analysts propose oth-
erwise-truly free (as in zero-cost) products will never characterize
even core, information-centric Free markets, let alone expand into of-
fline markets. Abundance will remain scarce. Projections of future
abundance fall into the common trap of adopting a dynamic supply-
side, but a static demand-side, viewpoint. Demand, however, is a mov-
ing target, causing true abundance to recede, mirage-like, ever further
into the future.
The Myth of Free is not benign. Part IV identifies the dangers of
mythologizing Free and condemns, on deontological and consequen-
tialist grounds, Myth-based policy decisions and proposals. Legal insti-
tutions have already begun to grant an undeserved protected status to
the suppliers of Free products. Such suppliers have received de facto
or de jure immunity from certain laws, as well as favorable treatment
in close cases. This is so despite the reality that these firms engage in
for-profit transactions that are structurally identical to traditional,
positive-price transactions. That unjustified protected status under-
mines the rule of law and distorts natural market competition, harm-
ing total welfare. Moreover, in response to the Myth of Free, analysts
have proposed altering existing regulatory regimes-even going so far
as to propose the elimination of market competition-in ways that
will necessarily yield suboptimal outcomes. Finally, policies designed
around the Myth overlook the persistent, compelling problems attend-
ant to scarcity, thereby inefficiently misdirecting much-needed socie-
tal resources.
2018] 517
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I. THE ORTHODOX ORIGIN STORY
You can make money giving things away. There really is a
free lunch. Sometimes you get more than you pay for.
-Chris Anderson15
The accepted version of Free's origin story generally begins with
the modern internet exploding onto the scene in the mid-1990s. 16 It is,
of course, true that widespread internet adoption marked the dawn of
a new era. Millions of personal digital computers, which had been
growing both more powerful and less expensive for decades, were sud-
denly connected. The cost of reproducing and distributing content-
based products (recorded music, films, books, and various other forms
of media) fell substantially. In fact, according to the Myth of Free-
and this is one crucial point at which the Myth departs from reality-
costs plummeted all the way to zero. Soon after, under this view, com-
petition drove the prices of those goods down to match their cost. In
other words, zero costs begat zero prices. Everything became Free.
A. Digitization and Online Distribution
More specifically, the Myth begins with a particular type of
cost-marginal costs-dropping to either zero or "near-zero. "17 Stan-
dard economic theory has long held that marketplace competition will
set the market price of a given product at its marginal cost to sellers.18
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., id. Of course, "free" products had been offered in the past-Anderson, for
example, discusses the famous Gillette strategy of "giving away the razors" while selling disposa-
ble, complementary blades. Chris Anderson, Free! Why $0.00 Is the Future of Business, WIRED
(Feb. 25, 2008, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2008/02/ff-free/ [https://perma.cc/EEZ4-
NZB8]. Broadcast radio and television would seem to fit the description as well. But it was
"[t]wenty-first-century Free"-not "twentieth-century Free"-that (we are told) changed every-
thing. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 3-4.
17 See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 2-3; Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 466-67, 481 (2015); Salil K. Mehra, Competition Law for a Post-Scarcity
World, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1, 3 (2016); Mike Masnick, The Importance of Zero in Destroying
the Scarcity Myth of Economics, TECHDIRT (Nov. 8, 2006, 12:57 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20061025/014811.shtml [https://perma.cc/MFB6-8LDW]. DeLong and Summers note that
"[high initial fixed costs and low, even zero, marginal costs pose difficult questions but also open
up enormous opportunities for economic policy." DeLong & Summers, supra note 4, at 48 (em-
phasis added).
18 See, e.g., MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 39 (2004)
(defining "market power" as "the ability of firms to set prices above marginal costs"). Sellers
continue producing additional units until the cost of making one more unit (the marginal cost)
equals the extra (marginal) revenue that unit will yield. Beyond that point, costs start to out-
weigh revenues, and it becomes irrational to produce and sell any additional output. This as-
sumes a perfectly competitive market.
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The Myth of Free draws upon this commonly invoked proposition to
argue that where digitization and digital distribution caused marginal
costs to drop to zero, prices fell to zero as a necessary corollary.19 And
even where marginal costs dropped only to "near zero" or "almost
zero," the Myth posits that the difference was still close enough for
sellers to round down the difference and adopt a price of zero.20 Ac-
cording to the Myth of Free, then, marginal costs became "too cheap
to meter," and thus "too cheap to matter." 2 1
This zero-cost-equals-zero-price dynamic has been embraced as
an "iron law." 2 2 In 1984, technologist and author Stewart Brand fa-
mously quipped that "information wants to be free, because the cost
of getting it out is getting lower and lower all the time." 2 3 Brand's
statement has become "a battle cry for the relentless march of the
Internet" 24 and is often repeated by those who embrace Free as an
economic inevitability.25 In the same vein, Anderson's Free contends
that "you can try to keep Free at bay with laws and locks, but eventu-
ally the force of economic gravity will win." 26 Rather more bluntly,
another commentator observes that "1990 isn't going to come
back. ... Trying to protect a system that's now fundamentally broken
is like trying to reroute a raincloud to go and thunderstorm over a
different town. You're better off dealing with the facts, and grabbing
your umbrella." 2 7
19 Masnick, supra note 17.
20 See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 92 ("Price has fallen to the marginal cost, and the
marginal cost of everything online is close enough to zero that it pays to round down.").
21 Id. at 77 (stating that "computer processing power, digital storage, and bandwidth ...
really are getting too cheap to meter"); id. at 75 (chapter titled "Too Cheap to Matter"); cf
Clayton M. Christensen & Derek van Bever, The Capitalist's Dilemma, HARV. Bus. REV., June
2014, at 60, 64 ("A fundamental tenet of economics is that some of the inputs required to make a
product or service are abundant and cheap-like sand. We don't need to account for such inputs
and can waste them, if need be.").
22 Malcolm Gladwell, Priced To Sell: Is Free the Future?, NEW YORKER (July 6 & 13,
2009), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/07/06/priced-to-sell [https:/perma.cc/7BLQ-
W5F5] ("Anderson does not consider this a passing trend. Rather, he seems to think of it as an
iron law .... ).
23 About That Quote "Information Wants to Be Free," PRICEONOMICs (May 29, 2014),
http://priceonomics.com/about-that-quote-information-wants-to-be-free/ [https://perma.cc/
J6WU-M78K]. Less often quoted is the rest of Brand's observation: "[I]nformation wants to be
expensive, because it's so valuable.... So you have these two fighting against each other." Id.
24 Id.
25 E.g., CORY DocTOROW, INFORMATION DOESN'T WANT TO BE FREE: LAWS FOR THE
INTERNET AGE 94 (2015) (quoting Stewart Brand).
26 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 241.
27 Amanda Palmer, Foreword to DocrORow, supra note 25, at xvii. Palmer is also known
as "Amanda (Fucking) Palmer." Interview with Amanda Palmer by Fawn Neun, BATTERED
2018] 519
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Where costs dropped to zero, the Myth continues, supply became
infinite.28 Infinite supply, in turn, means nothing less than the end of
scarcity and the beginning of an age of abundance. 29 The birth of Free
thus marked the dawn of what one scholar calls the "zero marginal
cost society," wherein capitalism will be largely replaced by a
"[c]ollaborative [c]ommons."30 Under this view, markets will increas-
ingly be released "from the ordinary economic rules of the physical
world. "31
For users and consumers, the birth of Free was supposed to have
represented a massive windfall. As Anderson puts it, "[T]his 'free'
wasn't just a marketing gimmick like the free samples and prizes in-
side that we're used to in traditional retail. . . . [It was] genuinely gra-
tis."32 Some legal scholars contend that "the most obvious and
pervasive benefit to be realized in the Big Data era has been the abil-
ity of firms to offer heavily subsidized, often free, services to consum-
ers as consumers give those firms permission to monetize consumer
data on the other side of their business." 33 To these scholars, data-
driven Free "is undoubtedly a benefit to consumers." 34 Others simi-
larly conclude that "[f]ree goods often provide real benefits to con-
sumers and are clearly procompetitive."35 This Free-as-consumer-
surplus argument seems to carry an intuitive appeal, one so powerful
that even skeptics tend to cede this ground. 36 If a product were to
SUITCASE (June 2009), http://www.vagabondagepress.com/90601/V2I1IN1.html [https://perma.cc/
X6UF-A2GL].
28 Masnick, supra note 17.
29 See RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 273 ("When the marginal cost of producing additional
units of a good or service is nearly zero, it means that scarcity has been replaced by abun-
dance."). See generally PETER H. DIAMANDIS & STEVEN KOTLER, ABUNDANCE: THE FUTURE IS
BETTER THAN You THINK (2012).
30 Jeremy Rifkin, Market Share, RSA, no. 2, 2015, at 33, 33 ("Capitalism is giving birth to a
progeny. It is called the sharing economy on the Collaborative Commons."). To be sure, Rifkin
offers a brief concession: "Even after the loT is fully paid for and plugged in, there will always
be some costs in generating and distributing information and energy. For that reason, we always
use the term near zero when referring to the marginal cost of delivering information, green
energy, and goods and services." RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 84. For a discussion of "near zero"
and other qualifiers, see infra Section II.A.2.
31 Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet's
Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 612 (2014).
32 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 3.
33 D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford, Antitrust and Regulating Big Data, 23 GEO. MA-
SON L. REV. 1129, 1133 (2016).
34 Id.
35 Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for
Antitrust Enforcement, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 523 (2016).
36 Schneier, for example, essentially concedes that digital goods are massively beneficial to
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actually carry no cost, then consumers of that product would ipso
facto receive more than what they paid for, necessarily reaping a wel-
fare surplus. 37 The gains would be infinite in relation to the costs. 3 8 Of
course, the validity of this argument depends on Free products actu-
ally being free, a premise analyzed and rejected below. 39
B. Expansion Offline
Some analysts predict that Free will spread beyond internet-cen-
tric, information-dominated markets.40 Under this vision, Free has al-
ready begun to, or will soon, expand offline. These narratives identify
several incipient or near-term technological advances that will drive
offline marginal costs to zero (or almost zero). Normatively, these
analysts argue that the end of offline scarcity will carry massive-even
unthinkable-ramifications for the institutional design and govern-
ance of societies. 4 1 Disruptive as it was, the birth of Free is predicted
to pale in comparison with the metastatic spread of Free to every cor-
ner of the globe.4 2 As Anderson puts it, "In the old paradigm, digital
goods too cheap to meter counted as an almost unimaginable cornu-
copia. But in the new paradigm, it's hardly worth counting at all." 4 3
The particular technologies that are supposed to spur offline Free
vary. One scholar points, for example, to the Internet of Things
consumers; with that point yielded, Schneier is forced to argue that society must "'stop the slide'
away from privacy, ... not because privacy is 'profitable or efficient, but because it is moral."'
Jack Goldsmith, The Ends of Privacy, NEW RAMBLER, http://newramblerreview.com/book-
reviews/law/the-ends-of-privacy [https://perma.cc/AMC4-5JNV] (reviewing BRUCE SCHNEIER,
DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATILES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR
WORLD (2015)).
37 Cf, e.g., Martin Wolf, Same as It Ever Was: Why the Techno-Optimists Are Wrong, FOR-
EIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-06-16/same-it-ever-was
[https://perma.cc/YH23-F53E] ("Moreover, say the techno-optimists, the 'consumer surplus' in
digital products and services-the difference between the price and the value to consumers-is
huge.").
38 Cf., e.g., id. ("Techno-optimists point out that before June 2007, an iPhone was out of
reach for even the richest man on earth. Its price was infinite. . . . Moreover, say the techno-
optimists, the 'consumer surplus' in digital products and services-the difference between the
price and the value to consumers-is huge.").
39 See infra Section II.C; see also MAURICE E. STUcIE & ALLEN P. GRUNEs, BIG DATA
AND COMPETITION POLICY § 1.26 (2016) ("Consumers do not invariably benefit when services
are 'free,' because these services are not actually free. Consumers pay with their personal data
and privacy.").
40 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 5.
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 Id. at 213.
5212018]
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("loT") as providing a new general-purpose technology platform."
Atop the loT, society will witness the merger of (1) the now-familiar
communications internet, (2) a developing renewable energy internet,
and (3) an entirely automated transportation internet.45 This hybrid-
ized loT will allow zero-cost energy to power zero-cost offline distri-
bution of goods. 46 Technology will thus pierce the "firewall" that
previously existed between online and offline markets. 47 And the
"Zero Marginal Cost Society" will emerge, bringing with it a "collabo-
rative commons" that will unleash human potential even further.48
Market capitalism, it goes almost without saying, will occupy a much-
diminished role.4 9
In a recent article, Mark Lemley highlights one relatively estab-
lished and three emerging technologies as the drivers of a "world
without scarcity."50 First, the modern internet brought about the end
of scarcity as to content.5 ' Second, 3D printing promises to do to phys-
ical goods what online peer-to-peer file-sharing services did to con-
tent: separate creation from production and distribution, eliminate
distribution costs, and put production in the hands of end users.52
Third, synthetic biology will do the same to the manipulation of living
tissue and organisms.53 Finally, the advent of general-purpose robotics
promises a similar disruption of the service economy by (again) drop-
ping marginal costs "towards zero." 5 4
Other analysts incorporate the "sharing economy" into the fold
of offline-scarcity-ending innovations. Sharing-economy platforms
connect owners of various underutilized assets (vehicles, housing, lux-
ury handbags, etc.) with customers desiring temporary ownership-like
access.55 Though certainly not "sharing" in the traditional sense,5 6 such
trades greatly increase efficiency by increasing capacity-utilization
44 See Alexander Hellemans, Jeremy Rifkin on the Internet of Things and the Next Indus-
trial Revolution, IEEE SPECTRUM (Apr. 14, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/
telecom/internet/jeremy-rifkin-on-the-internet-of-things-and-the-next-industrial-revolution
[https://perma.cc/38CW-DREK].
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 Id.
48 See RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 1-2.
49 See id. at 2-11 (describing "the eclipse of capitalism").
50 Lemley, supra note 17, at 466-81.
51 Id. at 470-71.
52 Id. at 474-75.
53 Id. at 475-79.
54 Id. at 479-81.
55 Tom SLEE, WHAT'S YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING ECONOMY 10 (2015) ("The
Sharing Economy . .. promises to be a sustainable alternative to mainstream commerce, helping
[Vol. 86:513522
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rates. The sharing economy turns consumer products into capital
goods, and consumers into capitalists.57 As one scholar, describing
these and other technologies, concludes, "Increasingly, economic
thinkers have come to take seriously the possibility that such develop-
ments are the result of moves towards a 'post-scarcity' society."58
C. The Formal Account
The Myth of Free can be restated as a syllogism comprising a ma-
jor premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. As with any syllogism,
the argument may fail one of two ways: either as a matter of form or
of substance. Thus, testing the validity of Free's origin story requires
inquiry into both its formal logic and the descriptive accuracy of its
premises.
Most fundamental to the orthodox account of Free is the major
premise, here termed the "Zero-Cost Premise." In its simplest form,
the Zero-Cost Premise holds that the internet and related digital tech-
nologies have caused the cost of many products to drop to zero. 5 9 The
prevailing focus is on marginal costs, 60 though some also suggest a sim-
ilar dynamic may be reaching (or will soon reach) fixed costs. A com-
mon permutation of this argument begins instead with "almost" or
us to make better use of under-utilized resources.... We can choose access over ownership ....
Well, that was the promise.").
56 Id. at 11 ("There is a contradiction built into the name 'sharing economy."'). Catherine
Rampell describes polling a group of five-year-olds on the meaning of sharing (after having
attended a conference on the "sharing economy"). The preschoolers decried the notion that
"sharing" could be done in exchange for payment. Catherine Rampell, What Preschoolers Can
Teach Silicon Valley About "Sharing," WASH. PosT (May 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/opinions/catherine-rampell-paying-for-your-fair-share-in-an-app-based-economy/2014/05/
15/007da348-dc66-11e3-8009-71de85b9c527..story.html [https://perma.cc/7KVV-LGEV].
57 Given this dynamic, it is striking that proponents of the sharing economy often herald it
as an antidote to capitalism. Thus, for example, Robin Chase, one of Zipcar's founders, predicts
that the sharing economy will give rise to a "new collaborative economy," and observes that, as a
result, "[w]e are witnessing the end of capitalism as we know it." Robin Chase, Bye, Bye Capital-
ism. We're Entering the Age of Abundance., MEDIUM: BACKCHANNEL (July 16, 2015), https://
medium.com/backchannellsee-ya-later-capitalism-the-collaborative-economy-is-taking-over-
34a5fc3a37cd#.ecyesulf4 [https://perma.cc/998T-5EKH]. If anything, the sharing economy would
seem to bolster capitalism.
58 Mehra, supra note 17, at 2.
59 At the same time, the convergence of digitization and the internet-particularly in the
age of "Big Data"-can also allow for increases in product quality. See STUCKE & GRUNES,
supra note 39, § 2.24 ("Firms can use data in providing 'smart' products that increase energy
efficiency and overall welfare.").
60 See infra Section II.A.1.
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"near" zero costs, and adds the "close enough" assumption: almost
zero is close enough to be treated as immaterial.61
Following from this is the minor premise, the "Marginalist Pre-
mise." The Marginalist Premise holds that competition in Free mar-
kets has driven prices down to marginal cost. 62 This premise depends
on an often-unstated assumption: that competition in such markets is
"perfect," a condition that in turn depends on several additional as-
sumptions. Thus, stated more fully, the Marginalist Premise is that
perfect competition has driven prices to marginal cost.6 3
Finally, the "Zero-Price Conclusion" is that prices in Free mar-
kets are zero.64 Thus, Free products are free-as-in-gratis, that is, zero
cost to consumers.
In sum, as to a given market featuring Free products, the argu-
ment is as follows:
(1) Marginal cost equals zero.
(2) Price equals marginal cost.
(3) Price equals zero.
In form, the Myth of Free is valid. The Zero-Price Conclusion
follows from the Zero-Cost and Marginalist Premises. The syllogism
avoids common formal fallacies like that of the undistributed middle.65
But a logically valid syllogism may also fail if it depends upon descrip-
tively false premises. The following discussion tests the premises un-
derlying the Myth of Free, as well as their permutations and their
underlying assumptions. It also examines the accuracy of the
conclusion.
II. FREECONOMICS 101: DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF FREE
Advocates of the Myth of Free purport to have discovered a new
system of economics, "Freeconomics," that has filled a gaping void left
in standard economics. 66 Freeconomics rests on the formal premises
61 See infra Section II.A.2.
62 See infra Section II.B.1.
63 See infra Section II.B.2.
64 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 17, at 485 (arguing that, as the marginal cost of online
content dropped to zero, so did prices).
65 Daniel Kahneman describes an experiment involving the following syllogism, which fea-
tures an undistributed middle: "All roses are flowers. Some flowers fade quickly. Therefore
some roses fade quickly." DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLow 45-46 (2011). A
large majority of subjects failed to identify the logical flaw: not all "flowers" in the middle pre-
mise are disposed of by either the major premise or the conclusion. See id.
66 See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 4 ("Somehow an economy had emerged around Free
before the economic model that could describe it.").
[Vol. 86:513524
THE MYTH OF FREE
set forth above-yet both of those premises, when subjected to close
scrutiny, reveal fatal flaws. Unsurprisingly, given the inaccurate nature
of both the major and minor premises, the Myth's conclusion-that
zero costs caused the price of many products to fall to zero-turns out
to also lack descriptive power. The Myth is revealed to be just that:
myth, rather than reality.
A. Defects of the Major Premise
The Zero-Cost Premise, though it has been invoked by scores of
economists and legal scholars,67 fails to describe reality. As it is usually
formulated, it depends upon a mathematical impossibility: costs that
continuously halve will eventually reach zero. Under an alternative
(charitable) understanding, the Zero-Cost Premise fails to account for
both the stubborn persistence of costs and what is referred to herein
as "the friction of the real." Even the weak form of this premise (mar-
ginal costs are close enough to zero) fails: a cost that is "close" to zero
is not close enough for a rational firm to simply ignore it. The follow-
ing subparts discuss each failure in turn.
1. The Stubborn Persistence of Costs
In its simplest form, the major premise of Free's origin story de-
pends on "zero" marginal costs. The orthodox accounts fall into two
camps. First, some expressly countenance the existence of zero margi-
nal costs. 6 8 Prominent economists, for instance, have observed that
"low, even zero, marginal costs pose difficult questions but also open
up enormous opportunities for economic policy." 6 9 Second, some ana-
67 See, e.g., infra notes 68-70.
68 Put another way, the works of present interest employ the idea of zero marginal costs
descriptively; these are to be distinguished from works that adopt "zero marginal costs" as an
assumption. For an example of the latter, see William R. Johnson, The Economics of Copying, 93
J. POL. ECON. 158, 160-61 (1985).
69 DeLong & Summers, supra note 4, at 48 (emphasis added); see also James Boyle, Cruel,
Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2012 (2000) ("Information is a public good, non-excludable and non-rival.
It is hard to stop one unit from satisfying an infinite number of users at zero or close to zero
marginal cost."); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REv. 1031, 1053 (2005) ("[In an information industry, marginal cost ... is zero or close to
it. .. ."); Thomas M. Lenard & Paul H. Rubin, Big Data, Privacy and the Familiar Solutions, 11
J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 1, 19 (2015) ("Many virtual goods, such as apps and software, also have high
fixed costs and low or even zero marginal costs."); Eben Moglen, Freeing the Mind: Free
Software and the Death of Proprietary Culture, 56 ME. L. REv. 1, 3 (2004) ("For the first time in
human history, we face an economy in which the most important goods have zero marginal
cost."); Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
2083, 2116 (2009) ("[E]xclusion is costly because of the nonrival nature of information. If an
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lysts qualify their references to zero marginal costs with terms like
"almost," "near," or "effectively."70 The discussion in the following
two Sections addresses the claims of the first group: that many mar-
kets now exhibit zero marginal costs.
a. Halving Costs Are Asymptotic
To explain how marginal costs fell to (actual, not almost) zero,
the Myth of Free points to the long-term development trajectories of
computer processing power, digital storage, and bandwidth.7 ' Over
the past several decades, the cost of these technologies has followed a
constant downward curve. As to processing, for example, Moore's
Law famously holds that semiconductors double the number of tran-
sistors they can hold every eighteen months.72 The corollary is that the
cost of a given unit of processing halves every two years. 7 3 Digital stor-
age capacity doubles each year, meaning its cost halves annually.74
Bandwidth speed doubles every nine months, with a corresponding
nine-month half-life for its cost per unit.7 5
According to the Myth, once information-based products could
be reproduced and distributed digitally, the marginal cost of such
products began to map onto the ever-halving cost trendlines of
additional person can use the information at zero marginal cost, excluding anyone from the
information makes little sense in terms of direct interests."). But see Daniel F. Spulber, Public
Prizes Versus Market Prices: Should Contests Replace Patents?, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'y 690, 703 (2015) ("The 'marginal cost price' of technology is not equal to zero.").
70 See, e.g., RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 11 ("nearly zero"); Keith N. Hylton, Patent Uncer-
tainty: Toward a Framework with Applications, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1117, 1123 (2016) ("essentially
zero"); Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse,
and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 335, 386 (2011) ("close to zero"); Lemley, supra note
17, at 461, 514 ("effectively to zero" and "near zero"); Jiarui Liu, Copyright for Blockheads: An
Empirical Study of Market Incentive and Intrinsic Motivation, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 490
(2015) (stating that the marginal cost of musical works "is near zero in the digital age"); Mehra,
supra note 17, at 3, 10 ("near-zero-marginal-cost" and "quite low or zero"); Johan David
Michels, False Sovereigns and Poor Stewards: Why Copyright Law Should Liberate the Trans-
formative Author, 21 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 317, 326 (2015) ("close to zero"); Georgios I.
Zekos, Cyber Versus Conventional Personal Jurisdiction, J. INTERNET L., Apr. 2015, at 3, 13
("essentially zero"). Even this author has trafficked in this trope. See John M. Newman, Copy-
right Freeconomics, 66 VAND. L. REv. 1409, 1426 (2013) (contemplating "[m]arginal costs ap-
proaching zero").
71 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 77.
72 Id.
73 See id. at 77-78.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 78.
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processing, storage, and bandwidth.76 Eventually costs became so low
that prices inevitably dropped to zero.77 Free was born.
But, when tested, this account rings hollow. To illustrate, consider
Zeno's Paradox. The ancient Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea devised
a set of paradoxes that seemed to prove that all motion is illusory.78
The most famous of these, known simply as Zeno's Paradox, is often
retold by reference to the wall nearest the reader.7 9 To touch that wall,
you must first cross half the distance to the wall.8 0 Next, you must
cross half the remaining distance-half of the half. After that, you
must again cross half the remaining distance, then half again, and so
forth, such that you may infinitely approach the wall but never quite
touch it.81
A similar principle applies to-and derails-the orthodox ac-
count of zero marginal costs. Money is infinitely divisible. Thus, even
if costs continue to fall by half every two years (or year, or nine
months, etc.) forever, they will never reach zero.82 The cost curves of
processing, storage, and bandwidth described above are asymptotic:
they may approach infinitely ever closer to, but would never touch,
zero. As the Myth of Free would have it, when technologies halve in
cost each year, zero marginal costs are inevitable.83 In fact, the oppo-
site is true: when technologies halve in cost each year, zero marginal
costs are impossible.
b. The Friction of the Real
Can the Zero-Cost Premise be saved via charitable interpreta-
tion? Though it does not appear to have yet been made, a variation of
the argument made by the Myth of Free's many proponents could
avoid the asymptotic cost-curve problem. Perhaps, this more nuanced
argument would run, instead of costs halving within a specified time
period, costs decline linearly, i.e., by a fixed dollar amount within each
76 See id.
77 Id. at 75 ("When something halves in price each year, zero is inevitable.").
78 Zeno's Paradox of the Tortoise and Achilles, PLATONIc REALMS, http://platonicrealms
.com/encyclopedia/zenos-paradox-of-the-tortoise-and-achilles [https://perma.cc/XDS5-22WV].
There is a mathematical explanation for Zeno's Paradox, but it does not save the Zero-Cost
Premise. See id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 And there is room to doubt that the same rate of innovation will continue forever. As
Tyler Cowen points out, the rate of productivity growth indicates slowing rates of human innova-
tion. See TYLER COWEN, THE GREAT STAGNATION 19-23 (2011).
83 See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 75.
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specified time period. If this were the case, marginal costs could theo-
retically reach zero, causing prices to follow.84
Processing, storage, and bandwidth are abstract in one sense: they
occur and exist in a meaningful sense beyond the realm of human per-
ception. Online interactions seem to occur in a separate place, apart
from the constraints of the familiar physical world. Early analysts ad-
dressing the interplay between the internet and the law stressed this
aspect. Two legal scholars, for instance, famously argued that
"[c]yberspace has no territorially based boundaries, because the cost
and speed of message transmission on the Net is almost entirely inde-
pendent of physical location."85 As a later commentator explained,
"Cyberspace was once thought to be the modern equivalent of the
Western Frontier.. . . [A]n abstract place, where land was free for the
taking, explorers could roam, and communities could form with their
own rules."86
The early understanding was misguided, and particularly so for
present purposes. To those grappling with, for example, how jurisdic-
tional analyses ought to map onto online interactions, users' percep-
tions (even if technically incorrect) of digital markets may well
matter.87 But understanding the economics of Free-and particularly
the question of whether marginal costs can reach actual, not near,
zero-requires rejecting the misperception that digital interactions oc-
cur in an abstract realm. As one scholar observed, "the idea that the
Internet is literally a place in which people travel is not only wrong
but faintly ludicrous."8 The same is true of the idea that the internet is
an abstract place through which products are delivered.
Computer processing, digital storage, and bandwidth occur and
exist in the familiar, physical world. They require real-world re-
84 The present discussion sets aside, for the moment, the remaining problems with the
Myth of Free, discussed infra Parts I, I.
85 David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (1996).
86 Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 439, 442-43 (2003) (footnote omitted); see also Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and
Space, 107 CoLum. L. REV. 210, 211 (2007) ("[T]he claim that cyberspace is deeply and essen-
tially different from 'real space' was a compelling one for many scholars.").
87 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 86, at 255 (arguing cyberspace should be "understood as
connected to and subsumed within an emerging, networked space that is inhabited by real, em-
bodied users and that is apprehended through experience"); Hunter, supra note 86, at 441
("[E]nclosing cyberspace and imposing private property conceptions upon it ... creat[es] a digi-
tal anticommons where suboptimal use of Internet resources will be the norm."); Johnson &
Post, supra note 85, at 1367 ("Cyberspace requires a system of rules quite distinct from the laws
that regulate physical, geographically-defined territories.").
88 Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 523 (2003).
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sources: metals for wiring, sand for silicon and glass, petroleum for
rubber and plastic. In the real world, these elements have always
been, and will always remain, scarce. There is not, and there will never
be, an infinite, costless supply of metal, sand, or petroleum. These
three related technologies also require electricity, the generation of
which entails consumption of real-world materials. Even renewables
are not-and cannot be-truly costless: generation and transmission
require physical materials. 89 Digital processing, storage, and
bandwidth do not occur in some abstract realm that transcends scar-
city. They occur in the real world, which means they come with real
costs. Those costs may be quite low, and may decrease lower still, but
they cannot reach zero.
Consider two examples of declining costs cited in Anderson's
Free: processor chips90 and YouTube's streaming costs.9 ' "In 1961, a
single transistor cost $10"; by 2009, Anderson claimed, it would cost
only a fraction of a penny, making processing "too cheap to meter." 92
YouTube's streaming costs for a given unit of audiovisual content
were likewise predicted to decline year over year-again, becoming at
some point "too cheap to meter."93
But the sale of pure computer processing power, even remote
processing power that is distributed online, remains a profitable enter-
prise-an unlikely outcome if the marginal cost of producing and dis-
tributing such power were truly zero. According to the Myth of Free,
zero marginal cost ought to lead to zero prices. Yet, to take one exam-
ple, Amazon reaps most of its considerable income not from its online
retail business, sales of its e-readers and e-books, or video-streaming
service, but instead from Amazon Web Services ("AWS"), its cloud-
computing arm.94 AWS supplies on-demand computing power: the use
89 See, e.g., J.P., The Cost of Renewable Energy: New Numbers, Same Conclusion, ECoNo-
MIST (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/08/cost-renewable-
energy [https://perma.cc/S2LS-NOCU] (discussing research on how best to calculate the costs of
zero- and low-carbon energy).
90 It is worth noting that although many Free products are provided by multisided plat-
forms, processor chips are typically supplied via vertical supplier-customer relationships. The
Myth of Free thus purports to extend beyond multisided contexts.
91 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 78.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See Evan Niu, Amazon Web Services Is Amazon.com's Shining Profitable Star, MOTLEY
FOOL (Oct. 25, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/10/25/amazon-web-
services-is-amazoncoms-shining-profitab.aspx [https://perma.cc/3J45-CBQU]. For a general
background on cloud computing, see Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman, Personal Juris-
diction and Choice of Law in the Cloud, 73 MD. L. REV. 313 (2013).
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of (supposedly) too-cheap-to-meter processors delivered via (suppos-
edly) too-cheap-to-meter bandwidth. But AWS is not Free. As of
2015, AWS generated "wholly half of Amazon's consolidated operat-
ing income." 95 The profitability of AWS and competing cloud-services
providers stands as compelling evidence that neither processing nor
bandwidth have become too cheap to meter or matter.96
Similarly, YouTube's streaming costs may be decreasing on a per-
unit basis, but have not reached zero. Such costs are variable, meaning
they contribute to (and perhaps compose the bulk of) YouTube's mar-
ginal cost to deliver an incremental unit of streaming video to a
viewer. As to a given unit of content, YouTube's bandwidth costs have
declined over time. 9 7 But streaming costs continue to have a sizeable
impact on YouTube's bottom line.98 Bandwidth remains scarce enough
that its costs offset every dollar of revenue YouTube managed to take
in during 2014.99 To YouTube, bandwidth has not become too cheap to
meter-and certainly not too cheap to matter.
Those who claim the existence of zero marginal costs fall into the
same trap as those who chase the elusive dream of perpetual mo-
tion.100 It is possible to imagine a perpetual-motion machine that runs
95 Niu, supra note 94. By October 2015, AWS had already brought in over $5 billion that
year. Julie Bort, Amazon's Huge and Profitable Cloud-Computing Business Is Up 78%, Bus.
INSIDER (Oct. 22, 2015, 4:42 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-cloud-business-is-up-
78-percent-2015-10 [https://perma.cc/PS73-AJ8E].
96 In fact, cloud providers like AWS make money precisely via metering: monitoring how
much computing power a customer uses and charging the customer accordingly. Andrews &
Newman, supra note 94, at 327.
97 See Ron Amadeo, Cheaper Bandwidth or Bust: How Google Saved YouTube, ARS
TECHNICA (Apr. 23, 2015, 9:05 AM), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2015/04/cheaper-band
width-or-bust-how-google-saved-youtube/ [https://perma.cc/7U4H-UY4V]. See generally Henry
Blodget, Economics of Online Video 2: Unit Cost Structure, Bus. INSIDER (Sept. 10, 2007, 10:05
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/2007/9/economics-of-on [https://perma.cc/84Z4-LWUS].
98 See sources cited supra note 97. YouTube is owned by Google, a subsidiary of its parent
company Alphabet. Rob Price & Mike Nudelman, One Chart that Explains Alphabet, Google's
Parent Company, Bus. INSIDER (July 23, 2016, 4:07 AM), http://www.businessinsider.comlchart-
alphabet-google-parent-company-deepmind-gv-x-nest-etc-2016-7 [https://perma.cc/M3FL-
TFZL].
99 See Rolfe Winkler, YouTube: 1 Billion Viewers, No Profit, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2015,
4:02 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/viewers-dont-add-up-to-profit-for-youtube-1424897967
[https://perma.cc/234Z-VHGM].
100 Would-be inventors have filed so many perpetual-motion-machine patent applications
that the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office promulgated a unique rule requiring such applicants to
submit a working prototype. See Gene Quinn, Turning Your Idea into an Invention,
IPWATCHDOG (July 29, 2017); http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/07/29/turning-idea-invention/
id=86224/ [https://perma.cc/S4CG-RER2]. But see Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1577, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that a device that outputs more energy than it inputs is impossible and
unpatentable).
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forever without violating the First Law of Thermodynamics.101 But
such machines are impossible in practice. 102 All are doomed by fric-
tion, the slightest amount of which will eventually cause an un-
powered machine to grind to a halt.103 This is the friction of the real.
At the heart of the attractions to both perpetual-motion machines
and zero marginal costs are fundamental-and uniquely human-im-
pulses. These fictions appeal to both "the best and worst sides of
human nature: the urge to transcend the limits of the possible, against
the desire to get something for nothing."1 04 The dream of zero margi-
nal costs and the Myth of Free similarly exude optimism, even utopi-
anism, while at the same time holding forth the illusory promise that
businesses can give, and consumers can get, "something for
nothing." 05o
But marginal costs are persistent. Even if the costs of processing,
storage, and bandwidth continue to halve each year for eternity, they
will never reach zero. And because each of these inputs occurs and
exists in the physical world, each requires scarce elements. Scarcity
means costs-the friction of the real. As a result, zero marginal cost
remains an impossibility, and accounts of its existence remain
mythical.
2. Costs (Always) Matter: "Close to Zero" Is Not Close Enough
The stubborn persistence of marginal costs presents a difficulty
for Free's traditional origin story. In response, some analysts offer a
more nuanced argument: costs have not fallen to zero, but they have
101 In a closed system, energy cannot be created or destroyed. Clara Moskowitz, Fact or
Fiction?: Energy Can Neither Be Created nor Destroyed, Sci. AM. (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www
.scientificamerican.com/article/energy-can-neither-be-created-nor-destroyed/ [https://perma.cc/
6M68-F6AN]. But so long as perpetual-motion machines only run forever, without performing
any kind of useful work, they skirt the First Law. See Christopher Wadlow, Patents for Perpetual
Motion Machines, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAc. 136, 137 (2007).
102 See Wadlow, supra note 101, at 137. There are two different types of perpetual-motion
machines; both are impossible in practice. See id. One not only runs forever, but also performs
useful work, without any energy inputs. Id. This type runs afoul of the First Law of Thermody-
namics. Id. The other, discussed above, does not violate the First Law but may violate the Sec-
ond-such machines are closed systems that fail to tend toward entropy. Id.
103 See id.
104 Christopher Wadlow, Abstract to Wadlow, supra note 101, http://jiplp.oxfordjournals
.org/content/2/3/136.abstract [https://perma.cclNNJ2-SPEW].
105 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 216. Recall the quote from Anderson at the beginning of
Part I: "You can make money giving things away. There really is a free lunch. Sometimes you get
more than you pay for." Id. at 4. The "you" in this passage manages to capture both for-profit
businesses (in the first sentence) and consumers (in the third). All of society can, in other words,
have its cake and eat it too.
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dropped to a point that is "close to zero" or "almost zero." 1 0 6 Under
this view, the Zero-Cost Premise holds that marginal costs are close to
zero.
Yet this shift requires an important logical leap. The often-unspo-
ken assumption at play is that "close to zero" is also close enough to
zero-close enough to zero that sellers rationally round down the dif-
ference (i.e., ignore costs) when setting prices.10 Some even make this
assumption explicitly, arguing, for example, that near-zero costs are
"too cheap to meter,"1 0 8 and that too cheap to meter is also "too
cheap to matter." 109
It is important to note that those who point to close-to-zero costs
and the rounding down of "too cheap to matter" do so when describ-
ing the conduct of for-profit firms, not that of natural persons. Natural
persons may exert uncompensated labor for a number of reasons de-
spite the fact that doing so entails positive costs. Such individuals may
be guided by social norms, incentivized by loose quid pro quo ar-
rangements, or rewarded by intrinsic positive affect. 10 The need for
the asserted rounding-down response to close-to-zero costs thus arises
only when analyzing the behavior of for-profit firms.
But, to a for-profit firm, "close to zero" can never be close
enough to zero. Or, to put it another way, even almost-zero costs are
not too cheap to matter. The crux of the problem with this particular
strain of Free's founding myth is that it casts for-profit suppliers as the
actors supposedly rounding down their near-zero marginal costs.
Rounding down such costs-i.e., charging nothing to offset them-
would make any given transaction unprofitable.
106 Broadcast media-television and radio-may be the only real-world example of prod-
ucts that exhibit true zero marginal costs. Assuming a constant signal strength, an additional
viewer or listener who tunes into a broadcast entails no marginal cost to the station. The author
thanks Professor Laurent Sacharoff for this insight. See also Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Pub-
lic Expenditure Theories, 40 REv. EcON. & STAT. 332, 335 (1958) ("[Wlhat ... are the true
marginal costs of having one extra family tune in on the program? They are literally zero."). But
this dynamic can hold true only for one-way broadcast media. Cf Stephen J. Bailey & Peter
Falconer, Charging for Admission to Museums and Galleries: A Framework for Analysing the
Impact on Access, 22 J. CULTURAL ECON. 167, 173 (1998) (noting that despite common claims
that marginal costs of visits to museums are at or near zero, marginal costs-in the form of
allowing an additional visitor to occupy space that could be used for other purposes-are pre-
sent). And such media are not the focal point of the Myth of Free.
107 See Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 31, at 612 ("Anderson therefore argues that it
makes sense to 'round down' and charge consumers nothing for many internet services.").
108 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 76-78.
109 Id. at 75 (chapter titled "Too Cheap to Matter").
110 See Lemley, supra note 17, at 487-96 (positing a number of explanations for zero-price
creative output).
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A single unprofitable transaction is unlikely to lead to a firm's
demise, particularly when the negative profit margin is small (the dif-
ference between "almost""' zero and true zero). But to see why this
dynamic matters a great deal for the viability of Free's orthodox origin
story, consider the embezzling scheme known as "salami slicing."112
Salami slicing consists of taking a small cut from each of a large num-
ber of transactions."3 While the individual sums are small, the total
amount embezzled can be substantial.114
The rounding-down version of the Zero-Cost Premise, however,
requires reverse salami slicing. Such rounding down would mean los-
ing a small cut from each of a large number of transactions.11 5 While
the individual sums would be small, the total amount of revenue lost
would be substantial. And in a cruel paradox, the more successful a
product became, the more money its supplier would lose.11 6 Crucially,
this dynamic remains in effect no matter how low costs get, so long as
they do not reach true zero. And, as shown above, costs can never
reach true zero." 7
111 It may bear noting that increasing a dollar amount from zero to any positive number
represents an infinite increase, raising the question of whether "almost" zero is a logical concept
at all. John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Applications, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 49,
66 n.95 (2016).
112 Salami slicing has repeatedly appeared in Hollywood films, including Superman III,
Hackers, and Office Space. Rob Wile, High-Frequency Trading Is Kind of Like What Richard
Pryor Did in 'Superman 3,' Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 2, 2014, 9:22 AM), http://www.businessinsider
.com/superman-3-and-high-frequency-trading-2014-4 [https://perma.cc/9WP9-ZAUA]. In fact, as
Office Space's would-be thieves discuss their scheme, one observes, "This sounds familiar." A
second replies, "Yeah. They did it in Superman III." Office Space Quotes, MOVIE-
QUOTESANDMoRE, http://www.moviequotesandmore.com/office-space-quotes-1/ [https://perma
.cc/KB62-T84L].
113 See, e.g., TERRY L. LEAP, DISHONEST DOLLARS: THE DYNAMICS OF WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME 65 (2007) ("[A] technique known as 'salami-slicing' has been used to divert large sums of
money from banks by rounding off account amounts to the lowest cent and transferring the
fraction of a cent to a special account.").
114 See, e.g., id. ("Although damage to a single account is miniscule, the perpetrator can
garner huge sums of money by salami-slicing thousands of accounts repeatedly.").
115 This scheme is literally a joke: "[t]he old business joke of selling at a loss but making it
up on volume." STEVEN J. PALEY, THE ART OF INVENTION: THE CREATIVE PROCESS OF Discov-
ERY AND DESIGN 181 (2010).
116 As the saying goes, "A billion here, a billion there, and pretty soon you're talking real
money," a quote often (perhaps apocryphally) attributed to Senator Everett Dirksen, whose
loquacity earned him the moniker "Wizard of Ooze." Mike Pesca, The Wizard of Ooze, SLATE
(Mar. 24, 2015, 6:52 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/podcasts/gist/2015/03/the-gist-angelina
jolies.bravery.and.todd-purdum.on.everettdirksen.html [https://perma.cc/M5VW-PBFM];
Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen Dies, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/minute/SenatorEverettMckinley-DirksenDies.htm [https://perma.cc/6C4A-MATX].
117 See supra Section II.A.1.
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Rounding down costs in this manner would violate one of the first
principles of economics: rational, self-interested behavior. A firm that
indefinitely sets prices below its costs will eventually be forced to exit
the market.118 And while the Myth of Free is presented as a paradigm
shift in economic thinking, its progenitors do not appear willing to
dispense with the standard assumption of rationality.119
Again, consider the example of YouTube, a service invoked by
Anderson as a prototypical example of Free. 1 2 0 At the time Free was
published, YouTube's streaming costs had been declining year over
year-but those costs were not, nor had they ever been, zero.1 2 1 And
YouTube streams a great deal of video each year. As one commenta-
tor points out, "'close enough to free' multiplied by seventy-five bil-
lion is still a very large number."1 2 2 By 2014, YouTube had become the
third-most visited website in the world, boasting more than one billion
users per month.1 23 But YouTube's streaming costs were also approxi-
mately $4 billion. 124 In other words, even five years after Anderson's
book saw print, YouTube's costs were still substantial enough to make
its entire business model unprofitable.
Some of the human users who contribute content to YouTube's
platform may do so for nonmonetary (or at least not directly mone-
tary) reasons.125 But these individuals are not the headline-grabbing
118 At least absent some subsidization mechanism. And Anderson's book is, to be sure,
filled with examples of clever subsidization mechanisms. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 3.
Yet the concept of subsidization is nothing new-and the Myth of Free purports to describe a
new phenomenon with new economic laws.
119 Consider, for example, one of the alternative subtitles of Anderson's book: "How To-
day's Smartest Businesses Profit by Giving Something for Nothing" (emphasis added).
120 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 91-93.
121 See supra Section II.A.1.
122 Gladwell, supra note 22 (emphasis added). Gladwell's review cited a Credit Suisse esti-
mate that YouTube would lose "close to half a billion dollars" in 2009. Id. Proponents of Free's
orthodox origin story pointed in response to potential errors in the Credit Suisse projections.
Mike Masnick, Chris Anderson, Malcolm Gladwell and a Look at Free, TECHDIRT (July 1, 2009,
10:57 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090701/0422125421.shtml [https://perma.cc/
8N3V-DH76]. But even the reassessment cited to by Masnick estimated YouTube's operating
loss for 2009 at $174 million-lower than the $470.6 million figure from Credit Suisse, but decid-
edly not zero. John Paczkowski, Credit Suisse Far Better at Analyzing Derivatives than You Tube
Infrastructure Costs, ALL THINGs D (June 17, 2009, 7:06 AM), http://allthingsd.com/20090617/
credit-suisse-far-better-at-analyzing-derivatives-than-youtube-infrastructure-costs/ [https://perma
.cc/57L3-PESU].
123 Yoni Heisler, The Third Most Popular Website on the Planet Still Can't Make a Profit,
BGR (Feb. 26, 2015, 5:50 PM), http://bgr.com/2015/02/26/google-youtube-profits/ [https://perma
.cc/QA8Z-G9VN].
124 Winkler, supra note 99.
125 Newman, supra note 70, at 1442-43.
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subjects of the Myth of Free, which instead concerns itself with for-
profit firms. And YouTube itself is a for-profit intermediary. YouTube
provides the inputs (servers, bandwidth, etc.) needed for video storage
and distribution not out of charitable goodwill, but in hopes of captur-
ing positive net revenue. Like any market competitor, it cannot hope
to do so by simply rounding down-i.e., ignoring-its costs.
The broader point, of course, does not depend on the rise or fall
of any particular business; YouTube may well become profitable. 2 6
But rounding down costs in the sense contemplated by Free's ortho-
dox origin story can never be rational. So long as costs are not truly
zero-and they can never be truly zerol2 7-any company that decides
to treat them as such will be reverse salami slicing: losing a small
amount of money on each transaction. A single slice may be too cheap
to matter. But small slices add up quickly. "Close to zero" is not close
enough.
B. Defects of the Minor Premise
The Marginalist Premise-which holds that competition in Free
markets has driven prices to match marginal costs-exhibits two ma-
jor defects. First, it misapplies the economic theory of marginalism.
Second, it rests upon the factually invalid assumption of perfect com-
petition. The following Section discusses each defect in turn.
1. Misguided Marginalism and Fixed Costs
The Marginalist Premise ("marginal costs equal zero") invokes
the economic concept of "marginalism": the idea that individual ac-
tors make economic decisions "at the margin," that is, unit-by-unit.1 2 8
The following discussion tests-and rejects-not marginalism itself,
but the Marginalist Premise's misguided application of marginalism.1 2 9
"Zero marginal cost" has become both a shibboleth (signaling that the
relevant narrative belongs to the canon comprising the Myth of Free)
126 For present purposes, "profitability" is used in a narrow sense to signify a business unit
that takes in more direct revenues than it spends in a given year. In a broader sense, YouTube
may well be "profitable" to Alphabet, Google's parent company. Adam Candeub argues, for
example, that YouTube plays a role in making Google the "lowest cognitive cost" option for
users vis-A-vis other internet portals, increasing Google's competitive advantage. Adam
Candeub, Behavioral Economics, Internet Search, and Antitrust, 9 I/S 407, 429 (2014).
127 See supra Section II.A.1.
128 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L. REV.
305, 306 (1993).
129 The Marginalist premise also depends on the often-unstated assumption of perfect com-
petition; the shortcomings of that assumption are discussed infra Section II.B.2.
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and a key that unlocks the door to an age of abundance.130 As such, it
allows authors to make an easy end run around the traditional eco-
nomic law of scarcity. Yet this powerful phrase has, to date, largely
escaped critical examination.
Marginalism plays a pervasive, yet often underemphasized, role
in modern social sciences and policymaking.13 1 In the early twentieth
century, economists waged a fierce battle over whether market par-
ticipants set prices with reference only to marginal costs (marginal-
ism), or to fixed costs also (full-cost pricing).132 This debate carried
implications far broader than its immediate contours, ultimately be-
coming one of the key formative events in the development of neo-
classical microeconomic theory. 13 3
Under the marginalist view, firms continue producing until the
marginal cost of producing an additional unit would outweigh the
marginal revenue from doing so. Prices are set at the intersection of
marginal cost and marginal revenue. To a marginalist, "[f]ixed costs
vanish from the firm's optimization problem and therefore do not fac-
tor into the optimal price." 1 34
Full-cost pricing, on the other hand, involves adding together di-
rect variable costs, an allocated portion of fixed costs, and a predeter-
mined profit margin. 35 Unlike marginalist pricing, full-cost pricing
does not take as its sole aim short-run profit maximization. "Rather
the pricing procedure is designed to enable the firm to reproduce itself
and grow."136 Proponents of full-cost pricing criticized marginalism as
130 It is, among other things, the title of an encyclopedic entry on wiseGEEK, John Mark-
ley, What Is Zero Marginal Cost?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-zero-marginal-
cost.htm [https://perma.cc/TY4D-7E69] (last updated Feb. 27, 2018), and the subject of posts on
the well-regarded blog Techdirt, see, e.g, Mike Masnick, Is the Zero Marginal Cost Society the
End of Capitalism... Or a Way to Fix Capitalism?, TECHDIRT (Apr. 1, 2014, 1:06 PM), https://
www.techdirt.com/articles/20140329/07150626725/is-zero-marginal-cost-society-end-capitalism-
way-to-fix-capitalism.shtml [https://perma.cc/MSX5-SL64].
131 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising the Progressive State, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1063,
1073-74 (2017) ("These [marginalist] models were to have profound implications, not only for
economic thought but also for the social sciences and policy concerning risk management....
The impact of marginalism on legal thought is difficult to exaggerate.").
132 See Frederic S. Lee, The Marginalist Controversy and the Demise of Full Cost Pricing, 18
J. ECON. ISSUEs 1107, 1107 (1984).
133 Roger E. Backhouse, Friedman's 1953 Essay and the Marginalist Controversy, in THE
METHODOLOGY OF POSITIVE EcoNoMIcs 217, 217 (Uskali Mlki ed. 2009).
134 Jacob P. Gramlich & Korok Ray, Reconciling Full-Cost and Marginal-Cost Pricing 2
(Wash.: Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Finance and Economics Discussion Series
2015-072, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/files/2015072pap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZW6G-6DL3].
135 Id. at 21-22.
136 Lee, supra note 132, at 1108.
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being unworkable in practice and, consequently, deficient in descrip-
tive power.1 3 7
In response, Milton Friedman's classic 1953 work, The Methodol-
ogy of Positive Economics, provided what has become the most en-
during defense of marginalism. 38 Friedman argued that the value of a
given theory lies not in the descriptive accuracy of its assumptions, but
solely in its predictive value.139 Thus, even assuming firms do not in
practice behave marginally, they may nonetheless reach outcomes
similar to those predicted by marginalist theory. This instrumentalist
justification insulated marginalism from empirically grounded
critiques.
Among economists, marginalism emerged largely victorious, and
full-cost pricing was relegated to the dustbin of history.1 4 0 But full-cost
pricing has, from time to time, been resurrected by economists in
search of a theoretical explanation for economic problems that cannot
be adequately solved via marginalism.141 And it remains true, as in the
early twentieth century, that the bulk of empirical evidence indicates
that most real-world firms include not just marginal costs, but also
fixed costs, in setting prices.142 Recently, some formal economic mod-
els have begun to follow suit.1 4 3 Given the theoretical and empirical
questions surrounding marginalism,144 and the apparent descriptive
value offered by full-cost pricing, the near-complete demise of full-
cost pricing in mainstream economic discourse is rather remarkable.
137 The most famous critic was perhaps Lester, whose article, Shortcomings of Marginal
Analysis for Wage-Employment Problems, published in 1946 in the American Economic Review,
occupied a prominent role in the debate. Richard A. Lester, Shortcomings of Marginal Analysis
for Wage-Employment Problems, 36 Am. ECON. REV. 63 (1946).
138 MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POsITIVE
ECONomics 3 (1953).
139 Id. at 15.
140 Lee, supra note 132, at 1107.
141 Id.
142 See Gramlich & Ray, supra note 134, at 4 (citing several accounting studies from the
1980s and 1990s showing "that full-cost pricing dominates managerial practices"). But see M.R.
Lukas, Pricing Decisions and the Neoclassical Theory of the Firm, 14 MGMT. Accr. RES. 201, 201
(2003) (criticizing accountants' empirical work but admitting that "the empirical evidence sup-
porting neoclassical price theory is not strong"). The common law of contracts generally recog-
nizes that sophisticated parties engage in full-cost pricing. See, e.g., Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex
Corp., 377 F.2d 795, 797-99 (3d Cir. 1967).
143 Gramlich & Ray, supra note 134, at 24.
144 Some modem critics contend that it was neither theoretical nor empirical shortcomings
that spurred the demise of full-cost pricing. Rather, "the doctrinal need to deflect any criticism
of ... neoclassical price theory" played a dominant role in marginalism's ascendance. Lee, supra
note 132, at 1124.
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Moreover, even assuming that marginalism holds instrumentalist
value, that value is limited. Suppose that a state of perfect competition
obtains in practice. 1 4 5 Standard theory tells us that suppliers in that
market would set prices at marginal cost. But such a strategy would be
rational only in the extreme short run. A firm selling at marginal cost
effectively achieves a negative profit on each sale because it fails to
recoup its fixed costs. 1 4 6 Such firms will, in the long run, fail and exit
the market.
Yet the Myth of Free adopts marginalism not solely to describe
short-run pricing decisions in response to environmental changes, but
to describe long-run equilibrium prices. According to the orthodox ac-
count, Free is the new normal, brought about by marginal costs declin-
ing to zero. 14 7 Friedman's instrumentalist defense of marginalism does
not, however, imply that prices, even in a perfectly competitive mar-
ket, will equal marginal cost in the long run. As another staunch de-
fender observed, marginalism was designed for the express purpose of
predicting changes in prices and output resulting from a given change
in that firm's environment. 148 It was, in short, not "designed to serve to
explain and predict the behavior of real firms" as to a particular price
or output rate over time.149
Those who argue that a new zero-price equilibrium obtains in
Free markets misunderstand, and therefore misapply, the theory of
marginalism. Where marginalism can neither describe firms' decision-
making processes, nor accurately model strategic pricing behavior,150
it ought not serve as the foundation for analysis. Yet it has been co-
opted to do both by proponents of the Myth of Free.15 '
These problems are compounded in many of the markets that
currently exhibit Free pricing behaviors. Digital products distributed
online (search, social networks, creative and informational content,
etc.) tend to carry fixed costs that are high relative to their marginal
costs. 1 5 2 The primary costs attendant to such services comprise startup
145 This is, of course, impossible. Id. at 1111.
146 Cf supra Section II.A.2 (describing the irrationality of reverse salami slicing).
147 See supra text accompanying notes 20-22 (describing the conception of Free as an "iron
law").
148 Fritz Machlup, Marginal Analysis and Empirical Research, 36 AM. EcON. REV. 519, 521
(1946).
149 Lee, supra note 132, at 1115 (quoting Fritz Machlup, Theories of the Firm: Marginalist,
Behavioral, Managerial, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 9 (1967)).
150 In this case, long-run behavior.
151 See RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 5.
152 Cf., e.g., Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach,
19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 58 (2005) ("Intellectual property is often very costly to create, but the
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and ongoing R&D, advertising, and the like. The marginal cost of
serving one additional user tends to be relatively miniscule.15 3
That attribute-fixed costs that are high relative to marginal
costs-permeates markets that exhibit Free pricing behaviors.154 But
this type of cost structure makes marginalism particularly unattractive
as a basis for pricing. In short, a firm with high fixed costs and negligi-
ble marginal costs cannot afford to focus exclusively on its marginal
costs as a means of setting its price.15 5 Where a product's fixed costs
are high relative to its marginal costs, marginalist pricing would lead
costs of creation, being invariant to output, are fixed costs once incurred. In contrast, the costs
that vary with output . . . often are very low, at least relative to the fixed costs; in the case of
software distributed over the Internet (including digitized musical recordings), variable cost, and
hence marginal cost, are close to zero."). Consider, for example, Google Maps, a popular online
mapping application. Even in its initial iteration, Google Maps represented an agglomeration of
technologies developed by several firms that Google had purchased. Liz Gannes, Ten Years of
Google Maps, from Slashdot to Ground Truth, RECODE (Feb. 8, 2015, 6:00 PM), https://www
.recode.net/2015/2/8/11558788/ten-years-of-google-maps-from-slashdot-to-ground-truth [https://
perma.cc/8K3V-T6V4]; see Noah Shachtman, Exclusive: Google, CIA Invest in 'Future' of Web
Monitoring, WIRED (July 28, 2010, 7:30 PM), http://www.wired.com/2010/07/exclusive-google-
cial [https://perma.cc/62RP-JHUC]. Over time, Google added various complex features (Google
Traffic, public-transit information, Street View, etc.) to arrive at the multifunctional incarnation
of Google Maps that, in 2013, became the most widely used mobile application in the world.
Jamie Hinks, Google Maps Is the World's Most Popular Smartphone App, ITPROPORTAL (Aug.
8, 2013), http://www.itproportal.com/2013/08/08/google-maps-is-the-worlds-most-popular-
smartphone-app/ [https://perma.cc/X9XZ-H32B]. This buildout required several years and un-
told millions of dollars spent purchasing various companies, paying an army of programmers to
write code, constructing specially outfitted camera cars, and collecting over 20 petabytes of
street-view imagery. See Gannes, supra; Leo Kelion, Google Maps Uses Ground Truth Project to
Battle Apple, BBC NEws (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-19536269
[https://perma.cc/EGC7-8TBM]. Yet the marginal cost of delivering a mapping search result is
relatively quite low.
153 The Department of Justice's ("DOJ") high-profile antitrust lawsuit against Microsoft in
the 1990s yielded another example. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.
2001). Some observers thought that Microsoft's pricing of Internet Explorer ("IE") was just a
reflection of low marginal costs and could not have been predatory. (In fact, the DOJ ultimately
dropped the predatory-pricing portion of its case.) But even if Microsoft's marginal costs of
distributing additional copies of IE were low, the fixed costs of producing and maintaining IE
were high-well over $100 million per year. See Newman, supra note 111, at 103-04 (citing
Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1722
(2013)).
154 Cf Posner, supra note 152, at 58 (describing intellectual property as property with a
"high ratio of fixed to variable costs").
155 See Lee, supra note 132, at 1121 (arguing that "because businesspeople view their firm
as a going concern, short period profit maximization is not adopted as a policy since it would
lead to the firm's demise in the long period"); see also Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse,
Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D and Patents, 3 INT'L J.
HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 183, 185 (2003) ("Marginal cost pricing would suffice to cover the
expenses of copy products that incur only production and distribution costs with negligible R&D
or promotion expense. But marginal cost pricing cannot generate sufficient revenue to cover the
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to suppliers (1) rapidly being driven out of business; (2) halting pro-
duction of the product; or (3) as to potential suppliers, deciding not to
enter the market.1 56 Suppliers of such products thus necessarily engage
in a substantial amount of full-cost pricing.157 In other words, they de-
pend for their very existence on rejecting (or at least largely rejecting)
purely marginalist pricing strategies. 58
Even if the marginal costs of Free products were zero (or "almost
zero," a proposition explored further below), the persistence of rela-
tively high fixed costs in Free markets undermines any descriptive or
predictive power marginalism-at least as that theory is employed by
proponents of the Myth of Free-might otherwise possess vis-A-vis
such markets. Substantial, underexplored questions remain as to
whether the universality of the marginalist assumption in modern eco-
nomics is warranted.1 59 For present purposes, however, it is enough to
observe that marginalism was not designed for use in describing or
predicting a long-run equilibrium price. Furthermore, by focusing ex-
clusively on marginal costs, the orthodox account of Free ignores fixed
costs, despite the crucial role that such costs play in real-world
behavior.1 60
Even viewed in isolation, the Marginalist Premise fails to with-
stand scrutiny and should be rejected accordingly. Long-run prices in
Free markets cannot equal marginal cost: zero is not the new normal.
As a result, both the major and minor premises of Free's formal ac-
count lack validity. But the Marginalist Premise cannot be viewed in
isolation. It could hold true only if an interrelated, and equally prob-
R&D costs of innovator firms. Hence free entry and the resulting marginal cost pricing are in-
compatible with sustained incentives for R&D.").
156 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 152, at 58 ("When fixed costs are a high percentage of total
costs, a price equal to marginal cost is unlikely to cover total costs unless marginal cost is sharply
rising.").
157 See Eric Raymond, Zero Marginal Thinking: Jeremy Rifkin Gets It All Wrong, ARMED
& DANGEROUS (Apr. 3, 2014), http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=5558 [https://perma.cc/6A7G-CYWJ]
("Even for pure information goods [setup] costs can be quite high.... If those setup costs are
not reliably priced into the final good, production of [pure information goods like] music will not
remain economically viable.").
158 A similar dynamic is generally thought to apply to public utilities-Coase, for example,
assumed that public utilities were unable to set prices at marginal cost, because "in [such] case a
loss is made." See R.H. Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA 169, 173 (1946).
159 See supra Section II.B.1.
160 As Brett Frischmann asks, "What about the fixed costs? Who is going to supply the
infrastructures necessary for the various near zero marginal cost systems to function?" Brett
Frischmann, Who Will Pay for the Zero Marginal Cost Society?, HUFFINGTON PosT (Dec. 6,
2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brett-frischmann/fixed-costs-zero-marginal-cost-
society b5124945.html [https://perma.cc/42M6-V9EX].
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lematic, assumption were also to hold true-that of perfect
competition.
2. Imperfect Competition
The Marginalist Premise underlying Free's orthodox origin
story-"price equals marginal cost"-requires not only that suppliers
of Free products engage in marginalist pricing, but also that competi-
tion in Free markets is perfect. Perfect competition is a standard eco-
nomic idealization. It describes the functioning of a marketplace that
meets several conditions, including perfect knowledge among all par-
ticipants, low barriers to entry and exit, etc. 61 Only if each condition is
met will the market price be driven to match marginal cost.162 And
only if price matches marginal cost could the orthodox account of Free
hold true.163
Most analysts agree that Free markets (online or offline) exhibit
at least some degree of competition.'64 But general consensus holds
that perfect competition remains impossible in practice.1 65 Perfect
competition is a theoretical construct that is not-and was not in-
tended to be-descriptive of real markets. It is useful instead as a
workable (if reductive) modeling tool, or a benchmark against which
to measure the relative imperfection of marketplace competition in
various sectors of the economy.1 66
In the early days of electronic commerce, some commentators
suggested that online markets heralded the possibility, if not the birth,
161 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 51-93 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1971)
(1921). Knight also assumed lack of collusion and monopoly instead of "many producers,"
though "many producers" has subsequently become the preferred condition. Id.
162 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Com-
petition, 74 IowA L. REV. 1019, 1025 (1989) ("Within the modern neoclassical model, 'perfect
competition' describes a state of affairs in which price is driven to marginal cost and firms are
forced to minimize their costs through innovation and growth to the optimal size.").
163 Some platforms offer "free" (or even negative-price) products to one group of custom-
ers in order to attract a paying group of customers, with the latter effectively subsidizing the
former. This business model does not per se indicate market imperfection. See, e.g., STUCKE &
GRUNES, supra note 39, § 1.26 ("Prices can be positive, zero, or negative (where consumers are
subsidized).").
164 See, e.g., id. § 7.20. But cf Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market's Con-
sumer Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 95 (2013) ("There is no functioning
market based on exchanges of personal information for access to online products and services.").
165 See, e.g., Daniel M. Hausman, Philosophical Foundations of Normative Economics, in
DEVELOPMENT DILEMMAS: THE METHODS AND POLITICAL ETHICS OF GROWTH POLICY 40, 54
(Melvin Ayogu & Don Ross eds., 2005) ("[Plerfect competition is impossible.").
166 See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45
UCLA L. REV. 143, 156-58 (1997) (explaining how perfect competition is often misunderstood,
particularly by pro-interventionists, whom Meese refers to as "Populists").
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of real-world perfect competition.1 67 Yet even such optimistic claims
typically carried caveats-for example, "the Internet offers the closest
thing to a perfectly competitive market in the world today." 68 Others
argued that online markets "approach" perfect, or "are closer to" per-
fect, etc.169 Skeptics responded that such caveats were well warranted,
pointing to a variety of deviations from the idealized state of perfect
competition. 170
For present purposes, it would be enough simply to note that
even the staunchest advocates of Free's orthodox origin story admit
(explicitly or implicitly) that Free markets are not perfect. The caveats
doom the premise. As noted above, any deviations from perfect com-
petition, no matter how slight, mean that price is not driven to match
marginal cost, even in theory. 71 And even a price slightly higher than,
or that almost equals, marginal cost means that the relevant product is
not Free.172 Scarcity prevails again.
With that in mind, only a brief examination of the state of Free
market competition is required. The aim is much the same as in Sec-
tion III.A.2, which critiqued the premise that marginal costs are now
"close enough" to zero. Here again, the formal account has already
been discarded, but the alternative argument may yet retain some rhe-
torical force. The following discussion serves to curb that force. It
does so by analyzing whether four of the conditions required to realize
the state of perfect competition are present in Free markets.
167 See, e.g., Frictions in Cyberspace, ECONOMIST (Nov. 18, 1999), http://www.economist
.com/node/346410 [https://perma.cc/ET99-GZ6X] ("T[he] explosive growth of the Internet
promises a new age of perfectly competitive markets. . .. Or so we are led to believe.").
168 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LExuS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL-
IZATION 81 (Picador 2012) (1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Edward Yardeni, then-Chief
Economist for Deutsche Bank).
169 John W. Bagby, Business Method Patent Proliferation: Convergence of Transactional
Analytics and Technical Scientifics, 56 Bus. LAw. 423, 457 (2000) ("Economists studying the 'new
economy' frequently argue that Internet commerce rapidly approaches perfect competition.")
(citing HAL VARIAN & CARL SHAPIRO, INFORMATION RULES (1999)); see also Sandra Marco
Colino, On the Road to Perdition? The Future of the European Car Industry and Its Implications
for EC Competition Policy, 28 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 35, 57 (2007) ("Online auctions have been
described as the closest one could reasonably get to perfect competition .... ); Robert E. Litan
& Alice M. Rivlin, Projecting the Economic Impact of the Internet, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 313, 315
(2001) (arguing that the internet will "bring[] many markets closer to the economists' textbook
model of perfect competition").
170 See Richard A. Epstein, Before Cyberspace: Legal Transitions in Property Rights Re-
gimes, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1137, 1145-53 (1998) (pointing to network effects); see also Mau-
reen A. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing
Information?, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1965, 1972-75 (2000).
171 See supra Section II.B.1.
172 See supra Section II.B.1.
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a. Product Differentiation
A core condition required for perfect competition is that the rele-
vant products be homogeneous, that is, perfectly fungible commodity
goods.173 During the Industrial Revolution, the critical lines of com-
merce in developed nations comprised homogeneous commodities:
steel, oil, aluminum, cement, pipes, wires, etc.174 These "smokestack
industries,"175 along with agricultural outputs like grains and tobacco,
dominated economies and were the primary objects of government
oversight. 17 6 Homogeneous products facilitate competition by facilitat-
ing (relative to heterogeneous products) low-cost, rapid, and compre-
hensive comparisons of price and quality by customers. 77 Because
such products are perfect substitutes for one another, customers can
easily shop around and play one firm off of another to obtain the high-
est quality product at the lowest possible cost. 7 8
But Free markets differ markedly from such traditional markets.
These products tend to be differentiated, not perfect substitutes.1 79
Take, for example, online social-networking platforms. Even ex ante,
such platforms tend to feature different site designs, functionality,
branding, and target audiences. 80 And once social networks begin to
function, "ex-ante identical sites can acquire differentiated market po-
sitions that spontaneously emerge from user-generated content."181
The same is true of online search, where a given search engine's al-
gorithm generally yields different results based on the unique user
queries that have been run using that engine in the past.1 82
173 See O'Rourke, supra note 170, at 1967-68.
174 See Posner, supra note 4, at 926 (listing "steel, automobiles, pipe, wire, aluminum, rail-
road cars, roadbuilding materials, and cigarettes").
175 Id. at 925.
176 See, e.g., id. at 926; see also John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the
New Economy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 681, 687 (2012).
177 See Newman, supra note 176, at 710 (discussing substitution effect on competition in
relation to software products).
178 See id.
179 See id. at 687-89 (discussing differences in network markets).
180 See id. at 689 (discussing networking platforms such as Facebook).
181 Kaifu Zhang & Miklos Sarvary, Social Media Competition: Differentiation with User-
Generated Content 1, 3 (Feb. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.parisschoolofecono
mics.eu/IMG/pdflPSE-comm-and-beliefs-june2Ol2-Sarvary-Zhang.pdf [https://perma.cc/FNE9-
678P] (pointing to Facebook and MySpace as examples of differentiated social networks). Addi-
tionally, if a social network tailors its users' feeds based on users' connections and past behavior,
even a single network may be differentiated as to different users. See Jake Linford, Scarcity of
Attention in a World Without Copyright 14-15 (July 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://serci
.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Linford.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EQX-C2YN].
182 But see DuckDuckGo Privacy, DUCKDUCKGo, https://duckduckgo.com/privacy [https://
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Differentiated products are understood to be a condition not of
perfect competition, but of monopolistic competition. 8 3 Many, if not
most, Free products are highly differentiated relative to archetypical
offline-market products.1 8 4 In this regard, then, the shift to Free ap-
pears to be a shift away from, not toward, the idealized state of perfect
competition.
b. Entry Barriers
The perfect competition model also assumes low barriers to en-
try. It has grown commonplace to claim that online markets, many of
which feature Free products, are characterized by low entry barriers.
Multiple U.S. courts, for example, have taken this view.185 Other ana-
lysts reach the same (or sometimes an even broader) conclusion.1 86
perma.cc/2PSB-NPHE] ("When you search at DuckDuckGo, we don't know who you are and
there is no way to tie your searches together. . . . This is a very unusual practice . . . .").
183 See Monopolistic Competition and Product Differentiation, U.C. SANTA CRUz, http://
people.ucsc.edul-nuclear/econ1/testinfo/chapterl6.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2M3-UNUC] (answer
key to PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, MICROECONOMICS (2d ed. 2009)) ("The three condi-
tions for monopolistic competition are (1) a large number of producers, (2) differentiated prod-
ucts, and (3) free entry and exit."). Economists "Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson are
usually credited with simultaneously and independently developing the theory of monopolistic
or imperfect competition." Don Bellante, Edward Chamberlin: Monopolistic Competition and
Pareto Optimality, 2 J. Bus. & ECON. REs. 17, 17 (2004).
184 John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
149, 178 (2015) (citing Zhang & Sarvary, supra note 181, at 3).
185 See, e.g., Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 416 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
("The Internet presents low entry barriers to anyone who wishes to provide or distribute infor-
mation."), rev'd, 539 U.S. 194 (2003); Shea ex rel. Am. Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[T]he Internet presents extremely low entry barriers to those who wish to
convey Internet content or gain access to it."); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 877 (E.D. Pa.
1996) ("[T]he Internet presents very low barriers to entry.").
186 See, e.g., Ilene Knable Gotts & Joseph G. Krauss, Antitrust Review of New Economy
Acquisitions, ANTrrRUST, Fall 2000, at 59, 59 (referring to "the low entry barriers in the Internet
space"); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case
Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 171, 195 (2011) (asserting, as to
online search, "that competition really is 'just a click away' for a significant number of users");
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 155, 161 (1997)
("[T]he most important differentiating characteristic of the Internet is its extremely low barriers
to entry."); Deborah T. Tate, Net Neutrality 10 Years Later: A Still Unconvinced Commissioner,
66 FED. COMM. L.J. 509, 518 (2014) ("The Internet's low entry costs and lack of barriers to
create, upload, start up, and sell goods and services are especially beneficial to women and mi-
norities with less access to capital than established firms."); Yana Welinder, A Face Tells More
than a Thousand Posts: Developing Face Recognition Privacy in Social Networks, 26 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 165, 189 (2012) ("[T]he Internet offers a platform for projects that require very little
capital investment-thus lowering the barriers to entry."); Barriers to Entry, Exit and Mobility,
ECONOMIST (July 13, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/14025576 [https://perma.cc/8QXU-
YX5U] ("Old ideas about barriers to entry were given a new twist with the development of e-
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But, as in all other contexts, the type and magnitude of barriers to
entering Free markets vary widely across individual markets.187 On
one end of the spectrum are products like simple mobile applications.
Barriers to entry may consist only of a few thousand dollars and a
small amount of time.188 At the other end of the spectrum are complex
products that require years of time, considerable expertise, and tens
or hundreds of millions of dollars (some of this in the form of sunk
costs, and coupled with substantial risk of losing same) to launch and
maintain. 189 During the U.S. government's high-profile antitrust pros-
ecution of Microsoft in the late 1990s, for example, it emerged that
Microsoft spent hundreds of millions of dollars developing and main-
taining Internet Explorer ("IE"), its downloadable web browserl 90 -a
prototypical Free product. Academic publishers Reed Elsevier and
Wiley similarly invested hundreds of millions of dollars developing
and launching digital-format publications. 191
Moreover, the proper focus is not merely on whether some type
of entry can occur, but on whether the type of entry that would pro-
vide a meaningful competitive check on dominant firms can occur.
Consider the comprehensive mapping service Google Maps, another
prominent Free product as of this writing. 19 2 Over a period of several
years, Google developed Maps by purchasing multiple companies and
integrating their individual proprietary technologies, compiling availa-
ble mapping data and satellite imagery, constructing specially outfit-
ted camera cars, collecting over 20 petabytes (21.5 billion megabytes)
of street-view imagery, integrating various ratings and reviews appli-
commerce. By using the internet, firms can sometimes surmount traditional barriers with an ease
not previously available.").
187 Cf STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 39, § 10.05 ("The reality is that entry analysis for
data-driven markets, as in other markets, will likely be fact-specific.").
188 See, e.g., Carter Thomas, How Much Does It Cost to Develop an App?, BLUECLOUD
SoLUTIONs (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.bluecloudsolutions.com/blog/cost-develop-app/ [https://
perma.cc/X4RY-3G96] (estimating that simple, table-based mobile apps cost between $1000 and
$4000 to develop).
189 See Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1695, 1721-22 (2013).
190 Id.
191 Adam Mossoff, How Copyright Drives Innovation: A Case Study of Scholarly Publish-
ing in the Digital World, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 955, 975.
192 In a 2008 decision, a U.S. district court described a similar dynamic in play among then-
dominant paid mapping services NAVTEQ and Tele Atlas. See Tele Atlas N.V. v. NAVTEQ
Corp., No. C-05-01673 RMW, 2008 WL 4809441, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2008) ("This is also a
market with incredibly high barriers to entry. Compiling a database like those developed by
NAVTEQ and Tele Atlas takes years of time and immense sums of money. A digital map maker
must invest enormous sunk costs before licensing a single copy.").
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cations, and spending millions on building out and maintaining the
infrastructure necessary to deliver the service to fixed and mobile
computing devices. 193 Perhaps it is possible for a small team of pro-
grammers to rapidly develop a rudimentary online mapping service-
in other words, there may be low entry barriers, depending on how
the relevant market is defined. But developing a service that would
act as a meaningful constraint on Google's product remains no small
task, as even well-heeled rivals like Apple have discovered. 1 9 4
In addition to time and sunk costs (plus risk of losing the same),
network effects may also constitute a barrier to entering Free mar-
kets.1 9 5 Network effects are present where the value of a product var-
ies along with the number of that product's users. 1 9 6 The direction of
network effects may be positive or negative, i.e., the value of a prod-
uct subject to network effects may be positively or inversely corre-
lated with user-base growth.197 Positive (but not negative) network
effects may create a barrier to entry that favors a dominant incumbent
or oligopoly. 198 Thus, the discussion that follows focuses on positive
effects.
Network effects may also be direct or indirect.199 Some Free
products appear to exhibit direct network effects. Social networks, for
example, attract new users by presenting them with the opportunity to
interact with other users.2 00 The value of a given network to users thus
increases along with the size of the network. 20 1 Other Free products
may exhibit indirect network effects. As to online search engines, for
example, indirect effects may arise "because users will not consider,
when deciding whether to run another query, that the results of their
query and subsequent clicking behavior on suggested links are stored
by the search engine." 202 Some argue that search quality is "only
193 Kelion, supra note 152.
194 See, e.g., Chance Miller, Apple Maps Now Used 3x as Often as Google Maps on iOS,
Serving 5B Requests Per Week, 9To5MAc (Dec. 7, 2015, 7:11 PM), http://9to5mac.com/2015/12/
07/apple-maps-usage-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/Y2DK-Y3C8].
195 Stucke and Grunes offer a comprehensive analysis of network effects in "data-driven
markets," many of which involve Free products. See generally STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 39.
196 S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8
J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135 (1994).
197 See Newman, supra note 176, at 688-89.
198 Id. at 689.
199 Id. at 688.
200 Id. at 689.
201 See STUCKE & GRUNEs, supra note 39, §§ 11.06-11.08.
202 Cddric Argenton & Jens Prtifer, Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities,
8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 73, 76 (2012).
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weakly affected" by search providers' storage of query data, citing
"conversations ... with industry insiders" as support. 2 03 Yet the impor-
tance of such stored data for search engine quality-at least over the
short run-is "widely acknowledged by the computer science
literature." 20 4
Network effects may cause multisided Free platforms to also ex-
hibit the "chicken-or-the-egg" barrier to entry. The chicken-or-the-
egg problem arises where a group of customers on one side of the
platform prefers a large installed group of customers on the other side
of the platform, and vice versa. 2 0 5 Thus, for instance, "having a credit
or charge card on a particular network . . . is more valuable to the
cardholder when there are more merchants willing to accept that card
and, conversely, the value to merchants of accepting [those] cards in-
creases with the number of cards on that network in circulation." 206
And it is merchant interchange fees that subsidize issuers' offering
free (or even negative-price) credit card services to cardholders.207 As
to advertising markets, the picture is more complex-magazine read-
ers, for example, appear to "value magazine advertising," while "TV
viewers are advertising-averse." 2 08 But where Free prices obtain on
the user side of an advertising-supported platform-and there is rea-
son to believe that Free may be a particularly sticky price209-advertis-
ing is the mechanism by which the platform is able to offer a Free
product. Thus, even if users are (in a narrow sense) "advertising-
203 Manne & Wright, supra note 186, at 212.
204 Argenton & Prifer, supra note 202, at 76. The long-run competitive significance of such
data is questionable. See, e.g., Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2008 of the
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on Data Protection Issues Related to Search Engines,
00737/EN/WP 148, at 19 (Apr. 4, 2008) ("In view of the initial explanations given by search
engine providers on the possible purposes for collecting personal data, the Working Party does
not see a basis for a retention period [for such data] beyond 6 months."). Some may argue that
this rapid rate of data decay points to a lack of entry barriers in data-intensive markets. But a
dominant firm that enjoys a much larger stream of data may nonetheless enjoy a competitive
advantage over potential or new entrants. Analogizing to water, the size of the reservoir may not
matter (much), but the rate of input flow does.
205 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
206 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). To the
extent it is relevant, the author represented the United States in this matter. All views expressed
herein are purely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the United States. None of
the views expressed herein depend or draw upon any confidential information.
207 Id. at 160.
208 See W. Wayne Fu et al., Search Advertising: Is There a Feedback Effect? 2 (TPRC 43:
The 43rd Research Conference on Commc'n, Info. and Internet Policy Paper, Aug. 14, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2588245 [https://perma.cc/BX5D-7YSC].
209 Newman, supra note 184.
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averse," 210 the positive affect created by Free may mean that such
users actually value advertising, albeit in a roundabout manner.
The foregoing is not meant to suggest that all Free markets ex-
hibit high barriers to entry. But many of the product markets at the
core of Free's orthodox origin story do entail substantial entry barri-
ers. Time, sunk costs, and network effects all contribute to this struc-
tural deviation from a state of perfect competition.
c. Imperfect Information
For perfect competition to exist, all market participants-suppli-
ers and customers alike-must have access to perfect, costless infor-
mation about all available products and partners. The advent of
digitization and widespread internet access (the technologies hailed as
bringing about the birth of Free) made certain types of information
easier to acquire. Suppliers in particular have benefited-software
firms both "know more" and "will progressively know more about the
users of their software." 2 11
But customers present a different story. At least as to one aspect
of market information, the rise of Free has degraded-not in-
creased-customers' ability to acquire relevant data points. Worse
still, that aspect is perhaps the most crucial to customers' ability to act
as an effective check on firms' behavior.
Comparing costs in traditional, positive-price markets is a rela-
tively straightforward exercise, often involving nothing more than
comparing price tags. But comparing costs in Free markets is rela-
tively difficult. Money is a perfectly fungible baseline for comparison:
one dollar is as costly to give up as another. Information and attention
costs are far more complex. One advertisement may be less costly to
view than another,212 just as one piece of personal data may be less
210 Fu et al., supra note 208, at 2.
211 Irina D. Manta & David S. Olson, Hello Barbie: First They Will Monitor You, Then
They Will Discriminate Against You. Perfectly., 67 ALA. L. REV. 135, 173 (2015).
212 In fact, a well-constructed advertisement may create a valuable, positive experience, or
impart valued product information, to consumers. See, e.g., Art Markman, What Does Advertis-
ing Do?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Aug. 31, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/ulterior-
motives/201008/what-does-advertising-do [https://perma.cc/2UUC-T9RR]. Model online-search
advertisements (also known as nonorganic search results) as being demanded by users, a dy-
namic that creates "two-way feedback effect[s]"-more advertisements equal more users, and
vice versa. Fu et al., supra note 208, at 3, 7. There would, however, seem to be upper bounds to
this dynamic. If such advertisements represented a positive experience to all users in all cases,
established search providers would abandon organic search results. Such is not the case: a typical
Google search-results page features one or a few nonorganic results, followed by dozens of or-
ganic results. And as Luca et al. empirically demonstrate, users are "more likely to engage with
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costly to surrender than another. 21 3 Accurately assessing attention
costs often requires first experiencing the desired product 2 1 4 and is
frustrated by the possibility that firms will, unbeknownst to consum-
ers, engage in behavioral advertising. 215 And accurately assessing in-
formation costs, whether ex ante or ex post, is so difficult that many
users simply choose to remain ignorant. 2 1 6 As one scholar points out,
"[T]he problem of consumers' failure to read or understand privacy
policies remains a possible source of market failure." 217 Moreover,
suppliers' use of Free instead of positive prices also imposes unique
monitoring costs on customers.2 1 8
All of this suggests that while the technologies that gave rise to
Free substantially increased the amount and decreased the cost of in-
formation available to suppliers, the same is not universally true of
customers. Nonprice cost information is relatively complex, inexact,
and expensive to gather. Free markets thus exhibit another important
deviation from perfect competition.
universal search results . . . when the results are organically determined relative to when they
contain only Google content." Michael Luca et al., Does Google Content Degrade Google
Search? Experimental Evidence 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-035, 2015), http://
people.hbs.edu/mluca/SearchDegradation.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NLZ-76BF].
213 See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Americans Say They Want Privacy, but Act as if They Don't,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/upshot/americans-say-they-
want-privacy-but-act-as-if-they-dont.html [https:/perma.cc/54EN-LMD8] (discussing the results
of a Pew Research survey). According to the survey responses, "The types of digital information
that people consider to be most sensitive are their Social Security numbers, health information,
the content of emails and phone calls and their location. They are least sensitive about their
purchasing habits, media consumption, political and religious views, and the identities of their
friends." Id.
214 As Hannibal Travis, describing IP-protected digital content, explains, "the quality and
characteristics of experience goods typically 'can be assessed only after they are bought."' Han-
nibal Travis, Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for Authors, or Napster for Books?, 61 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 87, 101-02 (2006) (quoting MICHAEL PARKIN, MICROECONOMIcs 468 (2d ed.
1994)). This experience requirement introduces the possibility that path dependence, rather than
inherent product qualities, will drive the direction of markets. Cf Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note
35, at 558 ("[W]hen path dependence is created, which eventually leads to lower quality than is
optimal even if goods are free, welfare can be harmed.").
215 See Newman, supra note 111, at 68.
216 Hoofnagle and Whittington use a transaction-cost economics approach to identify the
substantial costs to users of assessing and monitoring information costs. See generally Hoofnagle
& Whittington, supra note 31.
217 Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet,
161 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1691 (2013).
218 See, e.g., Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 31, at 610-11; Jan Whittington & Chris
Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy's Price, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1327, 1328 (2012).
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d. Imperfect Rationality
Perfect competition requires that all actors in a given market are
perfectly rational and act so as to maximize their own utility.2 19 Ra-
tional actors accurately assess the costs and benefits of all available
courses of action and choose the option that yields the greatest wel-
fare surplus (or least welfare deficit).220 Deviations from such rational-
ity create a state of imperfect competition, wherein price will not
necessarily equal marginal cost.22 1
Human customers display at least two, likely interrelated, behav-
ioral deviations in Free markets. First, such customers exhibit an irra-
tionally strong demand response to the introduction of zero prices. In
other words, "people appear to act as if zero pricing of a good not
only decreases its cost but also adds to its benefits," even where an
objective cost-benefit analysis would seem to favor choosing the posi-
tive-price option. 2 2 2 This response, known as the Zero-Price Effect, is
not explained away by either the absence of transaction costs or the
possibility of "ratio-based" customer analysis. 2 2 3 Second, human cus-
tomers' outsized preference for Free may contribute to wasteful or
inefficient behavior: "[O]verconsumption, scarcity, and even hoarding
[can occur] when resources are provided without charge." 224
Such irrational behavior distorts the functioning of markets.
These behavioral deviations may not be exhibited by firms; existing
research on the Zero-Price Effect is limited to human subjects.225 But
219 Some have dubbed this curious creature "homo economicus," implying that she does
not in fact exist outside the abstract world of neoclassical economic theory. See, e.g., Jules L.
Coleman, Markets, Methods, Morals and the Law, 66 ALA. L. REv. 169, 172 (2014) (defining
"conditions of 'perfect competition"'); Max Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral
Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 115, 121 n.81 (2012) (describing the inception of the behavioral
economics movement).
220 See Coleman, supra note 219, at 172.
221 See id. at 189.
222 Kristina Shampanier et al., Zero as a Special Price: The True Value of Free Products, 26
MARKETING Sci. 742, 742 (2007). The basic structure of the experiments that first confirmed the
existence of the zero-price effect involved (as in the example used above) two different sets of
prices for the same two competing products. See id. at 743. The first pairing of prices offered to
consumers generally consisted of two positive prices (e.g., $0.01 for one product and $0.15 for
the other). See id. The researchers then offered the same goods to consumers with the second set
of prices, this time establishing one positive price and one zero price (e.g., $0 for the product that
had previously been offered at $0.01 and $0.14 for the product previously offered at $0.15). See
id.
223 See id. at 745, 748-49.
224 Benjamin Edelman, Priced and Unpriced Online Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
2009, at 21, 21-22.
225 See Newman, supra note 184, at 187.
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many of the markets at the core of Free's orthodox origin story com-
prise products delivered to human users and consumers. 2 26 Main-
stream economics is increasingly accepting the likelihood that humans
act in ways that are boundedly rational.227 There is no principled rea-
son to think that humans respond to Free with a particularly high de-
gree of rationality-on the contrary, there is a great deal of support
for the proposition that humans respond to Free with a particularly
high degree of irrationality.228 As a result, competition in Free markets
is necessarily-and perhaps particularly-imperfect.
C. The Flawed Conclusion: Free Is Not Free
The Myth of Free concludes that the price of Free products is
zero. Search, social media, many mobile applications, travel booking,
navigation and mapping systems-all are (the story goes) now availa-
ble to consumers free of charge. Economists;229 regulators; 230 Courts
deciding cases involving antitrust,231 contract, 2 32 and consumer-protec-
tion laws;233 and the United States itself; 2 34 all have labeled such prod-
ucts "free."
That conclusion is descriptively inaccurate: Free is not free-as-in-
gratis. When used as a product descriptor, "free," in common usage,
226 See supra Part I.
227 See, e.g., Douglas Clement, Interview with Richard Thaler, FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPO-
LIS (Oct. 3, 2013), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/interview-with-
richard-thaler [https://perma.cc/FV8B-2TEL] ("In 2015, [Richard] Thaler will become president
of the American Economic Association-an ironic but telling indicator of the gradual embrace
of behavioral economics by a profession undergoing continuous evolution.").
228 See David Adam Friedman, Free Offers: A New Look, 38 N.M. L. REv. 49, 72 & n.167
(2008) ("Social and cognitive psychology explain the power of the word 'free' and may explain to
a certain extent the widespread use of the term in marketing.").
229 See, e.g., Geoffrey Manne & Joshua Wright, What's an Internet Monopolist? A Reply to
Professor Wu, TRUTH ON MKT. (Nov. 22, 2010), https://truthonthemarket.com/2010/11/22/whats-
an-internet-monopolist-a-reply-to-professor-wu/ [https://perma.cc/62EV-9NTN].
230 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Files Antitrust Law-
suit to Stop H&R Block Inc. from Buying TaxACT (May 23, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opal
pr/justice-department-files-antitrust-lawsuit-stop-hr-block-inc-buying-taxact [https://perma.cc/
CN4A-HHUJ].
231 See, e.g., Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL
831806, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
232 See, e.g., Darnaa, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 15-cv-03221-RMW, 2015 WL 7753406, at
*2-3, *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2015).
233 See Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 31, at 657 (citing In re Facebook Privacy Li-
tig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Cal. 2011)).
234 See Note by the Delegation of the United States, Roundtable on Two-Sided Markets, at
3, DAF/COMPIWD(2009)68 (June 4, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/
us-submissions-oecd-and-other-international-competition-fora/roundtabletwosided.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2GK7-45BB].
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denotes zero cost.2 35 But many of the products at the core of the Myth
of Free are provided by for-profit firms. Calling such products "free"
without explaining how or why for-profit firms would offer them begs
the question.236 Some may simply be mistaken: "[F]ree online prod-
ucts and services may give people the impression that firms do not
need to recoup the cost of producing the goods they consume. This is
not the case."237 But purposefully calling the output of for-profit firms
"free" is misleading; it amounts to "the substitution of rhetoric for
argument. "238
A few Free products truly are free-as-in-gratis, at least to consum-
ers. Online encyclopedia Wikipedia,239 for example, is operated by the
Wikimedia Foundation, a nonprofit organization. 240 The Foundation's
motives are (presumably) philanthropic; its free-to-use product is sub-
sidized by charitable donations. 241 Beyond philanthropic organiza-
tions, some Free products are the result of collaborative efforts
spurred by various selfish, social, and reputational motives. As an ex-
ample of such efforts, some point to "Free and Open Source Software,
such as Linux, MySQL and Apache." 242 The development (if not nec-
essarily the installation and maintenance)243 of open-source products
is effectively subsidized by zero-cost labor (which can be, in turn, the
235 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 1, at 12 ("[W]henever one says a resource is 'free,' most
believe that a price is being quoted-free, that is, as in zero cost.").
236 Newman, supra note 184, at 152.
237 Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 31, at 620.
238 Herbert Hovenkamp, Rhetoric and Skepticism in Antitrust Argument, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1721, 1721 (1986); see also David Foster Wallace, Tense Present: Democracy, English, and the
Wars over Usage, HARPER'S MAG., Apr. 2001, at 39, 47 n.23 ("[L]anguage is ... irreducibly
public, political, and ideological."); id. at 55 ("Usage is always political, of course .... ).
239 See Jodi L. Wilson, Proceed with Extreme Caution: Citation to Wikipedia in Light of
Contributor Demographics and Content Policies, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 857, 859 (2014)
("Wikipedia is well known as the free, online encyclopedia that anyone can edit.").
240 See Verne G. Kopytoff, Wikipedia Marks 10 Years of Edit-It-Yourself, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
13, 2011, 9:27 AM), http:/Ibits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/wikipedia-marks-10-years-of-edit-it-
yourself/ [https://perma.cc/4YCN-W2TM].
241 See Sydney Ember, Wikipedia Begins Taking Donations in Bitcoin, N.Y. TiMEs (July 30,
2014, 6:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/wikipedia-begins-taking-donations-in-
bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/923U-2Y6U]; Kopytoff, supra note 240.
242 Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 35, at 527; see also Heidi S. Bond, Note, What's So Great
About Nothing? The GNU General Public License and the Zero-Price-Fixing Problem, 104
MICH. L. REV. 547, 548 (2005).
243 Popular open-source content management system Drupal, for example, can cost tens or
hundreds of thousands of dollars to deploy. See, e.g., Tom Kenooy, The True Cost of a CMS,
MEDIUM RARE INTERACTIVE, INC. (Feb. 3, 2012) http://mediumrareinc.com/the-true-cost-of-a-
cms/ [https://perma.cc/A9SD-52ZM] (noting that "'Free' still costs money").
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result of the various concerns noted above). 244 Both of these types of
Free products are free in at least some limited sense of the term.245
Yet retellings of the Myth of Free rarely mention, let alone focus
on, such products.2 4 6 Instead, the orthodox account of Free celebrates
the output of for-profit firms: Google's online search, email, video-
hosting, and mapping services; Facebook's social network; etc. That
output is rarely, if ever, free in the common-usage, zero-cost sense of
the term.2 4 7
When for-profit firms operate in Free markets, they do not do so
out of charitable goodwill. Offering Free products entails real, and
often substantial, costs. 24 8 For-profit firms must recoup those costs. 2 4 9
To recoup their costs, they extract payment from consumers. 25 0 In-
stead of paying with fiat currency, consumers pay with their attention
or personal information. 251 And where consumers pay, no matter the
medium of exchange, Free is not free.
Industry insiders agree: "Advertising, or the promise of advertis-
ing, is the economic foundation of the world wide web." 252 Free busi-
ness models depend on advertising.253 Some Free business models
depend on external advertisements: displaying third-party advertise-
ments to users. Thus, for example, streaming audio and audiovisual
244 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
245 Of course, even nonprofit-provided "free" products entail costs, hence (for example)
Wikipedia's frequent requests for user donations. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying
text.
246 This neglect is, perhaps, unsurprising: nonprofit institutions have long offered products
and services free of charge.
247 Newman, supra note 111, at 79-82.
248 See supra Section II.A.
249 See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing the problems inherent in reverse salami-slicing
schemes).
250 See, e.g., STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 39, § 1.26 ("[T]hese services are not actually
free. Consumers pay with their personal data and privacy.").
251 Newman, supra note 111, at 54; see also STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 39, § 1.26.
252 Maciej Ceglowski, The Internet with a Human Face, Address at Beyond Tellerrand
(May 20, 2014), http://idlewords.com/talks/internet-with_a_humanjface.htm [https://perma.cc/
BXX5-KTHE]; cf Mike Masnick, Scarcity Isn't as Scarce as You Might Think, TECHDIRT (Mar.
22, 2007, 1:04 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20070322/024237.shtmil [https://perma.cc/
XP25-HA28] ("By creating a tremendously useful index of information (a non-scarce good),
[Google] has brought together a community, and it is effectively selling that community's atten-
tion (a very scarce good) to those who value it-advertisers.").
253 See Ethan Zuckerman, The Internet's Original Sin, ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 2014), http://
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/advertising-is-the-internets-original-sin/3760 4 1/
[https://perma.cc/4YZX-4LWA] ("Advertising became the default business model on the
web . . . because it was the easiest model for a web startup to implement, and the easiest to
market to investors.").
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services, search, etc., often use a multisided-platform model to con-
nect advertisers with users.254 Other Free models depend on internal
advertisements. "Freemium" businesses, for example, function by ex-
posing all users to the product-i.e., advertising-in hopes of eventu-
ally enticing some users to pay in fiat currency.255
And for-profit firms' demand for increasingly effective (and
therefore valuable) advertisements drives the interrelated demand for
personal information. 2 5 6 Ethan Zuckerman, one of the inventors of the
pop-up advertisement, observes, "Demonstrating that you're going to
target more and better . . . requires moving deeper into the world of
surveillance." 257 Users of many Free products now pay with both their
attention and their information?.2 5  Demand for the latter derives from
demand for the former. 25 9
A few governmental institutions have recognized that Free is not
free, 260 but those decisions are more the exception than the rule. U.S.
254 Rifkin, rather curiously, predicts that user-generated content delivered via "sites like
YouTube, Flickr, Facebook, etc." spell the end of advertising-"When consumers become
prosumers and exchange content for free with one another in a sharable economy, what added
value is corporate advertising bringing to the table?" RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 250.
255 See generally ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 26-27 (describing freemium business models).
Some firms accept Bitcoin, not a fiat currency, but a true "currency" in the sense that, e.g., data
is not, despite increasingly common observations to the effect that "data is the new currency."
See Marjorie Censer, Six People to Watch: Helping Government Agencies Use Big Data, WASH.
POST (June 17, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/six-people-to-
watch-helping-government-agencies-use-big-data/2012/06/15/gJQAbUcqjVstory.html [https://
perma.cclWG25-X4RS] (quoting Bill Perlowitz, Vice Chairman, Big Data Commission).
256 Personal information may also be used to improve the quality of a product, James C.
Cooper, Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, the First Amendment, and Subjectivity, 20
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2013), but it is information as an exchanged cost that is rele-
vant here.
257 Zuckerman, supra note 253.
258 Don Marti provocatively argues that-although seemingly a paradoxical outcome-the
more targeted advertisements become, the less valuable they are. Don Marti, Targeted Advertis-
ing Considered Harmful, ZGP, http://zgp.org/targeted-advertising-considered-harmfull [https://
perma.cc/6NRW-TRZR]. This is so because the signaling value of advertisements is diluted as
they are targeted at increasingly narrow slivers of the population. See id.
259 The demand for advertising itself can also be understood as derived demand-buyers
desire cost-saving information, generating demand for advertising by the seller. Isaac Ehrlich &
Lawrence Fisher, The Derived Demand for Advertising: A Theoretical and Empirical Investiga-
tion, 72 Am. ECON. REV. 366, 366 (1982).
260 During the mid-1980s, a Texas prisoner named Steve Jennings filed an unusual lawsuit
against a local radio station. According to Jennings, KSCS promised its listeners to always play
"at least three-[songs]-in-a-row, or we pay you $25,000." Jennings v. Radio Station KSCS, 708
S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tex. App. 1986). KSCS allegedly played only two songs in a row, then refused to
pay Jennings when he demanded the promised $25,000. Id. In response to Jennings's breach of
contract claim, KSCS argued that there was no consideration for its promise-in essence, that its
programming was free to Jennings. Id. The court rejected the defense: KSCS benefitted by draw-
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courts have stated that users of free services are not "consumers"
under state consumer protection law,2 6 1 that online search is not
"sold" to users,262 and that an online video-hosting platform ought to
be able to contract away liability for negligence in part because it "is
offering a service for free to the public." 263 That courts could reach
such conclusions demonstrates the enduring power of the myth of
Free.
Because Free is not free, the "Free equals consumer-welfare sur-
plus" argument (often raised in connection with policy arguments
based on the Myth of Free)264 lacks validity. Skeptics need not have
ceded this ground.2 65 The bare fact that a product is offered at a price
of zero does not necessarily indicate consumer benefits.266 Consumers
who pay for a product via attention or information nonetheless pay
for that product.2 6 7 And there is no principled reason to think that
consumers are particularly advantaged vis-A-vis Free-product suppli-
ers, such that consumers would necessarily extract a surplus of value
from zero-price transactions.
The cost of many Free products-and particularly the high-pro-
file products most often associated with Free as a phenomenon-is
not zero. Free is not free. The orthodox origin story of Free depends
on flawed major and minor premises. It comes as no surprise that the
conclusion proves to be false as well.
III. FREE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
The demise of Free's orthodox origin story leaves a void and
raises multiple questions: If Free is not the inevitable result of zero
marginal costs, why did it become so prevalent? If Free was a re-
sponse to the initial lack of online payment architecture, why has it
ing in listeners like Jennings, who pay not with money, but with attention. Id. at 62 ("Appellee
also benefitted by the promise. KSCS gained new listeners, like appellant, who listened in the
hope of winning $25,000.00."). In a similar case, a state court held that a gambler gave considera-
tion by allowing a casino to track her spending habits-i.e., paying with personal information.
Gottlieb v. Tropicana Hotel & Casino, 109 F. Supp. 2d 324, 329-30 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
261 See Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 31, at 657 (citing In re Facebook Privacy Li-
tig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Cal. 2011)).
262 E.g., KinderStart.com, LCC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
263 Lewis v. YouTube, LLC, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 219, 224 (Ct. App. 2015); accord Darnaa,
LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 15-cv-03221-RMW, 2015 WL 7753406, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2015).
264 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
265 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
266 See STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 39, § 1.26.
267 See id.
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remained the default price of the internet, now that high-quality on-
line payment systems are ubiquitous and inexpensive? And what of
Free's future-will Free recede, persist in its current form, or (as some
predict) expand offline?
A. Whence Free? A Revisionist History
With Free's orthodox history dismantled, a revisionist history is
needed. Free products did not explode in popularity due to the elimi-
nation of marginal costs or the presence of perfect competition.
Rather, four distinct, though interrelated, phenomena are the prime
movers behind Free's rise. First is what has been memorably described
as "the Internet's original sin." 268 Second is the rampant copyright in-
fringement that marked the early days of widespread internet adop-
tion and usage. Third, the Zero-Price Effect has amplified the
attractiveness of Free business models. Fourth, consumers' difficulty
assessing nonprice costs has added to Free's long-term staying power.
1. The Internet's Original Sin
As internet adoption rates began their steep ascent during the
early 1990s, firms hoping to turn a profit via the new medium faced a
problem. Until the mid-1990s, 2 69 no online payment systems were
available to the general public. 2 7 0 As an alternative, sites could opt
directly into the traditional credit-card-platform structure by signing
up as merchants. But, although doing so allowed a firm to accept
credit payments online, the underlying architecture continued to ex-
hibit flaws, including a days-long lag in verification-request response
time.2 7 1
Some businesses-most notably e-commerce retailers 272 Amazon
and eBay-were successful early adopters of online payments.273 But
268 Zuckerman, supra note 253.
269 CompuServe's "Electronic Mall" was launched in the mid-1980s, but it was not availa-
ble to the general public. Dave Roos, The History of E-commerce, HowSTuFFWORKS (Apr. 15,
2008), http://money.howstuffworks.com/history-e-commerce.htm [https://perma.cc/X9MY-
9ZVA].
270 See Zuckerman, supra note 253.
271 See Claire Tsosie, Mobile Payments Take a Click, but Processing Takes Days,
NERDWALLET (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/banking/banking-news/slow-
mobile-payments/ [https://perma.cc/2WT7-R76Z].
272 Strandburg, supra note 164, at 98 (identifying the e-commerce approach as a distinct
business model).
273 Sandeep Krishnamurthy, A Comparative Analysis of eBay and Amazon, in INTELLI-
GENT ENTERPRISES OF THE 21sT CENTURY 29, 29-30 (Jatinder N.D. Gupta & Sushil K. Sharma
eds., 2004) (discussing the innovation and success of Amazon and eBay); Christopher Matthews,
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many others either remained primarily focused on growing user bases
rather than revenues 274 or experienced substantial difficulty attracting
sustainable cash flow via online payments.275 Zuckerman, a former de-
signer at early internet startup Tripod.com, aptly describes the scram-
ble for a workable business model that ensued during the mid- to late
1990s:
Over the course of five years, we tried dozens of revenue
models .... We'd run as a subscription service! Take a share
of revenue when our users bought mutual funds after reading
our investment advice! Get paid to bundle a magazine with
textbook publishers! Sell T-shirts . . . !276
The hunt was on for an alternative to traditional payments. In
1984, online service Prodigy was launched with the financial backing
of CBS, IBM, and Sears Roebuck. 2 7 7 In exchange for funding, Prodigy
displayed "at the bottom of every Prodigy page" advertisements fea-
turing its backers. 2 7 8 Prodigy's advertisements functioned much like
print advertisements; users could not "click through" the advertise-
ment to reach the featured firm's website. In September 1993, a now-
defunct firm called Global Network Navigator sold the first-ever
"clickable" online advertisement to a Silicon Valley law firm.27 9 In Oc-
tober 1994, AT&T is said to have bought the first-ever "banner ad,"
which appeared on WIRED's website.2 80 Shortly thereafter, website-
hosting service Tripod.com developed and deployed the first "pop-up"
Will Amazon Take Over the World?, TIME (July 16, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/07/16/
will-amazon-take-over-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/G44T-8M5F] (discussing success of Ama-
zon); see also Megan Garber, Here Is the First Book Ever Ordered on Amazon, ATLANTIC (Oct.
31, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/10/here-is-the-first-book-ever-
ordered-on-amazon/264344/ [https://perma.cc/TJ7F-KMZZ] (characterizing Amazon as an early
adopter of new technology and services and noting that Amazon sold its first book in 1995).
274 See Zuckerman, supra note 253.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Karen W. Arenson, CBS, LB.M., Sears Join in Videotex Venture, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15,
1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/02/15/business/cbs-ibm-sears-join-in-videotex-venture.html
[https://perma.cc/HCF9-4DXS]; Benj Edwards, Where Online Services Go When They Die, AT-
LANTIC (July 12, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/07/where-online-
services-go-when-they-die/374099/ [https://perma.cc/9M3J-6VWQ]; Tom Shea, Big Firms Team
Up on Videotex Project, INFoWORLD, Mar. 12, 1984, at 13.
278 Srobona Basu, History of Online Advertising, OWNER'S MAG (Nov. 11, 2016), https://
ownersmagazine.com/history-of-online-advertising/ [https://perma.cc/A5V3-8BN6].
279 Ankit Oberoi, The History of Online Advertising, ADPUSHUP BLOG (July 3, 2013),
https://www.adpushup.com/blog/the-history-of-online-advertising/ [https://perma.cc/9PSA-
FT4A].
280 Ryan Singel, Oct. 27, 1994: Web Gives Birth to Banner Ads, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2010, 7:00
AM), http://www.wired.com/2010/10/1027hotwired-banner-ads/ [https://perma.cc/65U8-NUSD].
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online advertisements. 281 By 2015, annual global digital-advertising
revenues had risen to more than $150 billion, and forecasters were
predicting that internet advertising would soon overtake television
advertising.282
And even these figures fail to include freemium or zero-price
complementary-goods strategies. These alternative Free business
models can also be viewed as dependent on a form of advertising.
Freemium offerings generate revenue by exposing a wide base of
users to the product, essentially using the Free version of the product
as advertising for the paid version. And Free-based complementary-
goods models-which date at least as far back as Gillette's famous
"free razors, paid blades" strategy 283-Similarly function via their pro-
motional value.
Online advertising, adopted in part because traditional payment
systems failed to map well onto the internet, became the lifeblood of
Free.28 4 As Maciej Ceglowski puts it, "Advertising, or the promise of
advertising, is the economic foundation of the world wide web." 2 85
Users quite literally pay attention in exchange for the products at the
core of Free's orthodox origin story.
As advertising increasingly became the internet's "default busi-
ness model," 286 competition drove technology firms to develop in-
creasingly profitable forms of advertising. One of the primary-and
most profitable287-means of doing so was to facilitate "behavioral,"
or "targeted," advertising.2 8 Behavioral advertising is advertising that
281 Zuckerman, supra note 253.
282 Press Release, Magna Global, Magna Global Forecasts Global Advertising Revenues to
Grow by +4.6% to $526 Billion in 2016 (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.magnaglobal.com/magna-
global-forecasts-global-advertising-revenues-to-grow-by-4-6-to-526-billion-in- 2 016 / [https://per
ma.cc/27CJ-KBWD].
283 Chris Henson, "Razors and Blades"-Why the Father of the World's Most Successful
Business Model Is Taking It on the Chin, AccEss (Apr. 17, 2014), http://visitaccess.com/razors-
and-blades-why-the-father-of-the-worlds-most-successful-business-model-is-taking-it-on-the-
chin/ [https://perma.cc/ZC9X-LEF6].
284 The similar difficulty of using traditional payment systems in broadcast radio and televi-
sion markets helps to explain why those markets (like online-content markets) were structured
such that consumers paid with attention, rather than money.
285 Ceglowski, supra note 252.
286 Zuckerman, supra note 253.
287 See Strandburg, supra note 164, at 101 (estimating that "rates charged for behavioral
advertising [are] about 2.7 times the rates for run-of-network advertising").
288 Alternative advertising strategies include "undirected" (or "run-of-network") and "con-
textual" advertisements. See id. at 99. These two have ready offline analogues. Undirected adver-
tisements are somewhat akin to a billboard advertisement posted next to a busy street: all
passersby view the advertisement regardless of personal taste or history. Contextual advertise-
ments, however, appear only in venues (or at times) likely to attract a certain type of viewer, one
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targets a particular viewer based on actual data about that viewer's
past actions. For example, a 2012 New York Times report revealed
that Target had been using its consumers' purchase data to predict
with a high degree of accuracy whether a given customer was preg-
nant, then targeting (as it were) those individuals with advertisements
for infant clothing, strollers, and the like. 2 8 9
With the rise of behavioral advertising, firms acquired a new
thirst for personal information about their users. Once behavioral ad-
vertisements became the "default model" supporting Free, firms natu-
rally began to "promise investors that advertising will be more
invasive, ubiquitous, and targeted and ... collect more data about ...
users and their behavior." 29 0 Competition drove a "tracking arms
race"-firms attempting to outdo one another by gathering more and
more personal information.291 As one scholar observes, "For years,
[internet] sites . . . have systematically improved their 'product' by
reducing user privacy." 2 92 Simultaneously, the rise of online advertis-
ing networks facilitated the aggregation of data about a given user's
behavior across the entire internet.293
This is the "internet's original sin." 2 9 4 Demand for personal data
is largely "derived demand" 295-it is incidental to demand for targeted
advertising. 296 With advertising-and increasingly, targeted advertis-
that may be predisposed to consuming the advertised product. Thus, for example, a firm market-
ing "Team Canada" hockey jerseys during the Sochi Olympics successively altered its online
advertisement to disparage each of Canada's various opponents. Jeff Quipp, Three Examples of
Contextual Advertising Done Right, HuFrPoST (May 19, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.ca/jeff-quipp/contextual-advertising-b_4992296.html [https://perma.cc/Y975-VLHV].
289 Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
MN8K-MH3D].
290 Zuckerman, supra note 253.
291 Ryan Tate, Amid NSA Outrage, Big Tech Companies Plan to Track You Even More
Aggressively, WIRED (Oct. 11, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/10/private-tracking-
arms-race [https://perma.cc/9R4M-BCZ9].
292 Bruce Schneier, Surveillance as a Business Model, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Nov. 25,
2013, 6:53 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/11/surveillance-as_1.html [https://
perma.cc/MXP3-M2ZD].
293 See Ben Thompson, Why Web Pages Suck, STRATECHERY (July 15, 2015), https://
stratechery.com/2015/why-web-pages-suck/ [https://perma.cc/8UVS-XA65].
294 Zuckerman, supra note 253 ("I have come to believe that advertising is the original sin
of the web.").
295 Ehrlich & Fisher, supra note 259, at 366. Ehrlich and Fisher posit that suppliers' demand
for (nontargeted) advertising is derived from buyers' "implicit demand for cost-saving informa-
tion" about the relevant products. Id.
296 To be sure, firms can also use such data to improve their products. See Cooper, supra
note 256, at 1130, 1135-36.
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ing-as the dominant business model, consumers of Free products pay
with their attention to advertisements and their personal information.
2. Copyright Infringement: The Zero-Price Competitor
The internet has been called "a giant copyright-infringement ma-
chine." 297 For a variety of reasons-expense, scalability, lack of ano-
nymity-physical copyright infringement has remained relatively
minimal over time.298 But with digitization, the storage and reproduc-
tion costs of copying certain types of creative works fell substan-
tially.2 9 9 Personal computers ("PCs") continued to increase in
capability and decrease in cost.30 Once connected via the internet,
PCs provided the backbone for widespread distribution of copy-
righted materials. 301 All that was needed was a platform.
In 1999, peer-to-peer ("P2P") file-sharing service Napster
launched, turning many end users into both consumers and suppliers
of infringing materials.302 Napster was not the first online avenue for
copyright infringement, but it was an overnight sensation: at its peak,
25 million Napster users were sharing 80 million digital files. 303 Copy-
right holders reacted swiftly, obtaining an injunction against the ser-
vice just one year after its launch. 304
But even before Napster's demise, second-generation P2P file-
sharing services rose up in its stead. Innovations like decentralized
structures and BitTorrent technology made these new platforms more
difficult to target via traditional legal means and more attractive to
end users. 3 0 5 Alternative infringement models (e.g., remote file host-
ing) also emerged. 306 Copyright holders found themselves on the los-
ing end of "a giant game of Whac-a-Mole." 307 Massive litigation
297 Mathew Ingram, The Internet Isn't Just Pipes; It's a Belief System, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
16, 2011, 4:32 PM), https://www.bloomberg.comlnews/articles/2011-11-16/the-internet-isn-t-just-
pipes-it-s-a-belief-system [https://perma.cc/9M5Z-5Z8S].
298 Newman, supra note 70, at 1420-21.
299 Id. at 1423-25.
300 Id. at 1421-23.
301 Id. at 1425.
302 What Is Napster?, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/2520/napster
[https://perma.cc/34Q4-DGEA].
303 Id.
304 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900-01 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
305 Newman, supra note 70, at 1427.
306 Id. at 1425.
307 Todd R. Weiss, Google Search Algorithm Update Means Better Copyright Protection,
EWEEK (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Search-Engines/Google-Search-Algorithm-
Update-Means-Better-Copyright-Protection-184969 [https://perma.cc/64WZ-3N3N] (quoting
copyright and patent attorney Anderson Duff).
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campaigns launched against both facilitators and end users triggered a
societal backlash and were abandoned.308
Online infringement represented a viable competitor to legiti-
mate rivals like Apple's iTunes Store, launched in 2001.309 While legiti-
mate firms often charged positive prices, the prevailing price for
infringing content was zero. 3 1 0 A core of users who shared copyrighted
content-for ideological reasons or as part of a rough quid pro quo-
supported the free-riding fringe. 3 11
This zero-price (albeit infringing) alternative exerted powerful
competitive pressure on copyright holders. The question became:
"[H]ow do you compete with free?" 312 The content available via in-
fringement facilitators like Napster-if not the platforms them-
selves313-was truly free, at least in the sense that suppliers exacted no
direct payment from customers. 314 Copyright holders needed to offer a
competitive alternative.
The rise of Free was, in part, a reaction to the persistent presence
of infringement as a zero-price competitor in the marketplace.3 15 Con-
sider, for example, Spotify, an online music-streaming service
launched in 2011.316 One of Spotify's cofounders explicitly identified
competition with infringing alternatives as its raison d'etre: "[W]e
308 See Ben Depoorter, Alain Van Hiel & Sven Vanneste, Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1251, 1264-65, 1268-69 (2011) (arguing that industry litigation efforts were perceived as
heavy handed and may have triggered increased infringement by those who began to perceive
copyright law as illegitimate).
309 Press Release, Apple Inc., Apple Introduces iTunes-World's Best and Easiest to Use
Jukebox Software (Jan. 9, 2001), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2001/01/09Apple-Introduces-
iTunes-Worlds-Best-and-Easiest-To-Use-Jukebox-Software [https://perma.cc/U4FA-KVYP].
310 Lemley, supra note 17, at 482-83. Lemley points to a zero-cost explanation for infringe-
ment. Id. at 482 ("[Als the cost of reproduction and distribution dropped to zero, piracy became
rampant on the Internet.").
311 See Newman, supra note 70, at 1442-43.
312 Mary Madden, The State of Music Online: Ten Years After Napster, PEw REs. CTR.
(June 15, 2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/2009/06/15/the-state-of-music-online-ten-years-af-
ter-napster/ [https://perma.cc/490C-BD3W].
313 Napster adopted an advertising-supported business model. Kate Kaye, Napster Aims to
Compete Through Ad-Supported Free Music Streams, CLICKZ (May 2, 2006), https://www.clickz
.comlnapster-aims-to-compete-through-ad-supported-free-music-streams/59809 [https://perma
.cclXW3J-PECH].
314 The risk of a copyright-infringement lawsuit did impose some cost, but even at the
height of the industry litigation campaigns that cost remained negligible relative to the benefits.
Newman, supra note 70, at 1434-35.
315 Kate Darling, IP Without IP? A Study of the Online Adult Entertainment Industry, 17
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 740 (2014) (relating qualitative survey evidence from the adult film
industry to the effect that, in response to rampant copyright infringement, "many producers
[began] giving away content for free").
316 See Adrian Covert, Why Did It Take So Long for Spotify to Come to the US?, GIzMoDo
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started thinking about how we could create a product that was better
than piracy."317 Free, in other words, "compete[s] with free."318
3. The Zero-Price Effect
The Zero-Price Effect ("ZPE") not only helps to explain the per-
sistence of Free; it also informs the preceding analysis of the birth of
Free. Consumers' outsized preference for zero-price products contrib-
uted to both (1) the explosion of infringement-facilitating services like
P2P file-sharing platforms and (2) the adoption of advertising-sup-
ported platforms as the default online business model. As to the for-
mer, the zero-price files available via file-sharing service Napster were
a primary driver in its rapid growth.319 In short, "users like free
things." 3 2 0 Today, "[t]he experience of the vast majority of [online]
publishers is that readers will not pay for content." 321 Indeed, "in most
cases, just a penny-a seemingly inconsequential price-can stop the
vast majority of consumers in their tracks." 3 2 2 The ZPE yields a pow-
erful competitive advantage to suppliers who take advantage of it. Ad-
vertising emerged as the primary means for doing S0.323
The ZPE thus presents, in place of the Myth of Free, a partially
behavioral account of Free's persistence. The Myth, though sometimes
offered as a refutation of or replacement for neoclassical economics, is
(or at least strives to be) fundamentally neoclassical-it adopts the
language and assumptions of price theory and marginalism. But, de-
spite cloaking itself in that venerable mantle, the orthodox account
ultimately reveals itself to be a flawed application of neoclassical
thought. The ZPE, though a deviation from the standard assumption
of perfect rationality, here offers a greater degree of explanatory
power vis-A-vis core Free products.
4. Difficulty Assessing Costs
Individuals also appear to experience a great deal of difficulty
when assessing attention or information costs. To complete the quote
(July 13, 2011, 10:02 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5821056/why-did-it-take-so-long-for-spotify-to-
come-to-the-us?tag=spotify [https://perma.ccIW52X-DYC5].
317 Id.
318 Peter Brody, Competing with Free, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 28, 2011), https://www
.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/competing-with-free [https://perma.cc/QQ4W-SDEW].
319 See Newman, supra note 70, at 1426.
320 Schneier, supra note 292.
321 Thompson, supra note 293.
322 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 59.
323 See Zuckerman, supra note 253.
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from Schneier, "[U]sers like free things, and don't realize how much
value they're giving away to get it."324 Whether framed as irrational
consumer behavior or as the result of effectively insurmountable in-
formation asymmetries, this dynamic presents substantial market op-
portunities-and for-profit firms should be expected to respond
accordingly.
Research indicates that consumers systematically underestimate
attention costs. According to one study, internet users believe online
advertisements to be "almost completely ineffective," 325 with almost
half of users reporting that advertisements have "no effect whatso-
ever." 3 2 6 Yet follow-on experiments demonstrated that advertisements
"had substantial persuasive and subtle distracting effects." 327
Consumers also systematically underestimate the amount of in-
formation costs they are willing to incur in exchange for a given prod-
uct. This effect is so pronounced that researchers termed it the
"privacy paradox." 3 2 8 In one study, for example, individuals stated
their willingness to disclose, on average, a maximum of 8.7 items of
personal information-but then went on to disclose nearly twice that
number.329
Consumers are relatively well able to weigh and respond to price-
based costs. Nonprice costs present substantially greater difficulties.
The problems that inhere in calculating, monitoring, and responding
to information and attention costs led Katherine Strandburg to con-
clude that "[t]here is no functioning market based on exchanges of
personal information for access to online products and services." 3 3 0
That conclusion is arguable. 331 But, at the very least, such problems do
help to explain the status quo. Firms, having replaced positive prices
with difficult-to-assess costs, unsurprisingly continued to impose such
costs even after the technological impediments to positive price set-
ting were alleviated.
324 Schneier, supra note 292.
325 Brad J. Sagarin et al., Bartering Our Attention: The Distraction and Persuasion Effects of
On-Line Advertisements, COGNITIVE TECH., Fall 2003, at 4, 5.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 14.
328 See Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R. Horne & David A. Horne, The Privacy Paradox:
Personal Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER AFF. 100 (2007).
329 Id. at 110-13. These results were observed in twenty-three individuals, a fairly small
sample size. Id. at 110.
330 Strandburg, supra note 164, at 95.
331 Newman, supra note 111, at 54 n.19 (contending that while Free markets may be very
imperfect, they do exhibit competition-in other words, that market failures do not of necessity
equate to failed markets).
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B. Whither Free?
With Free's past and present reconceived, what of its future? That
question breaks down into three parts, the first dealing with actual,
advertising-supported Free products, the latter two dealing with the
mythical, zero-cost-based version of Free. First, going forward, will the
digital products at the core of the Free phenomenon continue to em-
ploy zero-price business models? Second, will the mythical version of
"Free" become reality, at least as to core, pure-information products?
Third, will the mythical Free expand, as some argue, into traditionally
offline industries like healthcare, food production, and manufactur-
ing? These questions (and their answers) carry critical implications for
the design and implementation of politico-legal systems. 3 3 2
1. The (Continuing) Zero-Price Advantage
Nearly all of the same factors that led to the birth of Free remain
in force, and will likely do so for the foreseeable future. The sole
countervailing development is the rise of readily available, inexpen-
sive, and near-instantaneous online payment systems. Payment tech-
nology now makes feasible (though perhaps still cost-prohibitive)
"micropayments"-small payments, often fractions of a cent, in ex-
change for access to a website or online application.33 3 And alternative
currencies (e.g., Bitcoin) may lower transaction costs so as to make
micropayments not only feasible, but practical. 334 Such innovations
make direct payments a more attractive-or at least less unattrac-
tive-alternative to Free.
But copyright infringement continues to act as a check on some
core Free markets involving information-centric products.335 Despite
the rise of noninfringing Free products, file sharing grew in magnitude
by more than forty percent from 2008 to 2014.336 And even if the rate
332 See infra Part IV.
333 See Sandy Ressler, Bitcoin Micropayments, a New Enabling Technology, BITCOIN MAG.
(Apr. 30, 2014, 2:00 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/bitcoin-micropayments-new-
enabling-technology-1398880834 [https://perma.cc/M2KN-8TQB].
334 Id.
335 It may be less relevant to some Free products like online search, where the product it-
self (search results) is generally not copyright protected. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1155, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
336 Robert Steele, If You Think Piracy Is Decreasing, You Haven't Looked at the Data. .. ,
DIGTTAL Music NEws (July 16, 2015), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2015/07/16/if-you-think-
piracy-is-decreasing-you-havent-looked-at-the-data-2/ [https://perma.cc/TFD3-8HNT]. These
data do not appear to distinguish between noninfringing and infringing instances of file sharing.
But, if the Napster and Grokster cases are any indication, much of the use likely constituted
infringement.
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of copyright infringement were to level off or decline, infringement
remains a potential substitute for legitimate content. Thus, the specter
of infringement alone may be enough to render Free markets rela-
tively contestable 37 and act as a check on the pricing behavior of non-
infringing firms.
Moreover, the ZPE and the difficulty of assessing nonprice
costs-both fundamentally human responses to the absence of posi-
tive prices-will likely remain in force for the foreseeable future. The
inverse of the positive affect (i.e., pleasure) generated by zero-price
transactions is the negative affect (i.e., pain) generated by positive-
price transactions. This negative affect, referred to by researchers as
the "pain of paying,"338 suggests that Free will remain the dominant
business model in markets where it already prevails.
In fact, to the extent that a current general trend can be identi-
fied, it appears to be away from overt and toward invisible payments.
Thus, for example, "[m]ore high-end boutiques and department stores
are moving the [cash register] out of sight or eliminating it entirely." 3 3 9
Private-taxicab service Uber explains that "[b]ecause there's no ex-
change of cash, the Uber experience is seamless for riders." 340 Broadly
speaking, the vanguard of payments innovation centers on delivering
such seamless customer experiences. As Anderson observes, "If you
charge a price, any price, we are forced to ask ourselves if we really
want to open our wallets. But if the price is zero, that flag never goes
up and the decision just got easier." 341
337 For a brief summary of contestability theory, see STEPHEN MARTIN, INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIZATION IN CoNTEXT 79-80 (2010).
338 Kam Leung Yeung, Exploring the Origin of Pain of Payment in Cash and Its Relevance
to Computer Payment Interface 14, 38 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Iowa State Uni-
versity), http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=5025&context=etd [https://perma.cc/
FB35-NXY4].
339 Ray A. Smith, Find the Missing Cash Register, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2016, 4:31 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/find-the-missing-cash-register-1457472672 [https://perma.cc/7272-
7UXJ].
340 Zara, Greater Accessibility for Riders and Drivers, UBER NEWSROOM (July 25, 2015),
https://newsroom.uber.com/greater-accessibility/ [https://perma.cc/PE5F-MLKA]; see also
Meghan McCarty Carino, Uber Tips Policy Causing Confusion, Possibly Lower Passenger
Scores, S. CAL. PuB. RADIO (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.scpr.org/news/2015/10/21/55137/uber-
tips-policy-causing-confusion-possibly-lower/ [https://perma.cc/9WFY-MJLU] (quoting Dan
Ariely) (users of popular private taxicab service Uber may be misled in part by the seamless
nature of transactions-"'[t]he value proposition of Uber is basically not thinking about
money' . . . . Uber eliminates . .. the 'pain of paying,' thus making cost less of a factor in using
the service.").
341 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 59.
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Given all of this, there is no principled reason to think that
Free-the exchange of sought-after products for valuable attention
and information-will recede. It may well expand, even offline. So
long as the value of the attention or information extracted exceeds the
cost of the relevant product, Free strategies are rational.
The only real limiting factor at play is the upper bound on atten-
tion supply: society possesses a fixed amount of attention, making it a
scarce good. 3 4 2 Standard economic theory suggests that this upper
bound constrains suppliers' ability to profitably engage in Free trans-
actions. 34 3 Land, a similarly scarce resource, offers a ready analogue.
There is an absolute upper bound on how much land can ever be em-
ployed productively. As demand for land increases, closer-to-marginal
(i.e., more costly, less productive, etc.) parcels must be developed and
farmed.3 44 Similarly, the spread of Free would require suppliers to ex-
tract closer-to-marginal units of attention. To do so, suppliers would
need to exchange increasingly valuable products. At some point, Free
becomes an irrational strategy.3 45 Thus, while Free may expand from
its current state, it will not do so ad infinitum.
2. Abundance: The Exception, Not the Rule
I may see the world more darkly than somebody who lives in
sunny Silicon Valley.
-James Comey34 6
Techno-optimists contend that mythical, zero-cost Free has not
only already dominated information-goods markets, but will also soon
expand offline, making the leap to industries like healthcare, energy,
food production, and manufacturing.347 This metastatic spread is pos-
ited as the inevitable end result of market competition.3 4 8 Subject to a
few exceptions, everything will become Free. Late-stage capitalism
342 See Masnick, supra note 252 (observing that a single person's attention is a "scarce
commodity"). It appears to be an open question as to whether information is similarly scarce-is
there an upper limit on how much information about a given individual can exist?
343 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
344 See KENYON A. KNOPF, A LEXICON OF EcoNoMIcs 191 (1991) ("More fertile land will
be put in use first because of its greater productivity. Less and less fertile land will be put to use
until that unit of land is reached that no one will bid for . . .
345 Cf id.
346 James Comey, Dir., FBI, Keynote Address at Symantec Government Symposium (Aug.
30, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/audio-repository/inside-podcast-comey-cyber-speech-090216.mp3/
view [https://perma.cc/UV3X-DLKN].
347 See supra Section I.B.
348 RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 308.
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will (we are told) hang itself by its own rope: the profit motive will
drive the price of everything to zero, leaving no profits to be had. 349
But even as to pure (or as close to pure as is realistically possible)
information goods, the friction of the real prevents true abundance.
Startup costs remain, even for a single programmer or musician who
must purchase a computer or guitar. It may be easy to trivialize such
costs in a developed economy, but such costs present a serious obsta-
cle to vast populations. And income and wealth disparities in even
developed economies dictate that such costs remain prohibitively ex-
pensive to many.350
Just as importantly, digital distribution still occurs in the real
world via physical infrastructure. Such infrastructure entails-and will
always entail-real costs. Costs must be recouped somehow; from
providers' point of view, they are never "too cheap to matter."351 Re-
coupment may occur via direct prices, attention or information costs,
taxation (for publicly funded infrastructure), or donations (for charita-
bly funded projects), etc. Some of these means of recoupment may
appear at first glance to yield Free products, but they do not herald a
coming Age of Abundance.
To the extent that costs fall far enough to allow socially motivated
production-here, some point to areas like "fan fiction and remix cul-
ture" 352-infrastructure costs yet remain. Platforms like YouTube,
Blogger, and the like have allowed a flood of user-generated content,
but the platforms themselves are not Free, dooming hopes that the
content is, or can become, Free. Rifkin predicts that user-generated
content delivered via "sites like YouTube, Flickr, Facebook, etc.,"
spell the end of advertising: "When consumers become prosumers and
exchange content for free with one another in a sharable economy,
what added value is corporate advertising bringing to the table?"35 3
The value, of course, lies in allowing intermediaries (like YouTube,
Flickr, and Facebook) to recoup their infrastructure costs.
Open-source projects, often lauded by proponents of Free as the
future of software production, often depend on the viability of posi-
349 Id. at 3-4.
350 In Memphis, Tennessee, for example, the poverty rate hovers around 30%, with child
poverty at a staggering 46.9%. Elena Delavega, 2015 Memphis Poverty Fact Sheet, UNIV. MEM-
PHIS: MID-SouTH FAM. & COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT INST. (2015), http://www.memphis.edu/
socialwork/pdfs/20153povertyfactsheetwebversion.pdf [https://perma.cc/CT3W-XETZ].
351 See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 75.
352 For a discussion of fan fiction and remix culture, see Steven A. Hetcher, Using Social
Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869 (2009).
353 RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 250.
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tive-price service contracts-and in that sense are not Free at all. And
the economics at play are unique.354 Open-source development tends
to depend on robust aftermarkets for services and support and low
capital costs.355 While computers have grown relatively inexpensive,
such aftermarkets are not present even for many information-centric
products, let alone other types of products. This limitation imposes a
severe (and underappreciated) upper bound on the viability of open
source.
Even as to information-centric products, Free will remain a myth.
Free cannot be the exception, let alone the rule. Yet some predict an
entire post-scarcity society based on Free healthcare, energy, manu-
factured products, etc.356 The further such predictions stray away from
information-centric products, the further into the realm of impossibil-
ity they venture.
The necessary physicality of infrastructure limits how far close-to-
zero costs can spread through society. (And, of course, even close to
zero is not close enough for Free to occur.)35 7 Consider, for example,
Rifkin's claim that advances in solar and wind energy production, har-
nessed by a "smart grid," will soon yield "Free Energy"358 (or at least
energy that is "nearly free").359 Nonprofit electric cooperatives will
supposedly emerge to fund the necessary infrastructure buildout and
maintenance. 360 This narrative points to the success of rural electric
cooperatives as presaging this widespread replacement of vertically in-
tegrated, for-profit utilities. 361 What remains unclear in this account is
how such cooperatives (should they emerge) will pay for infrastruc-
ture costs. Rural electric cooperatives do so via billing their custom-
ers.3 62 Calling such cooperatives a "commons" does not change the
fact that their electricity is not delivered for Free. Though increased
use of renewable energy sources may be a long-term societal boon,
society cannot expect the output of such sources to be Free. Again,
costs must be recouped.
354 Raymond, supra note 157.
355 See, e.g., Joel Spolsky, Strategy Letter V, JOEL ON SOFTWARE (June 12, 2002), https://
www.joelonsoftware.com/2002/06/12/strategy-letter-v/ [https://perma.cc/NT6Y-RZTW] ("Smart
companies try to commoditize their products' complements.").
356 See, e.g., RIFKIN, supra note 11.
357 See supra Section II.A.2.
358 See RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 81-84, 205-06.
359 See id. at 84-85 (predicting that electricity will become "almost free").
360 Id. at 103-04.
361 See id.
362 See, e.g., Kay Elec. Coop. v. City of Newkirk, 647 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch,
J.) (analyzing an antitrust complaint brought by a rural electric cooperative).
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As the Myth of Free ventures offline, it runs further aground on
the costs of physical inputs. Some point to 3D printing as the key to a
Free revolution in manufacturing, 363 but "[b]ecause 3-D printers re-
quire feedstock, the marginal cost of producing goods with them has a
floor well above zero."a3 This is so because producing and transport-
ing physical inputs entails substantial costs. Rifkin attempts to evade
this problem by conjuring an "Energy Internet" and a "Logistics In-
ternet" 365-but such solutions run into the infrastructure-cost prob-
lem, as discussed above. As one critic pointedly asks, "What about the
fixed costs? Who is going to supply the infrastructures necessary for
the various near zero marginal cost systems to function?" 366 3D print-
ing may increase efficiency, but it cannot eliminate costs. Even Lem-
ley, who proposes a "world without scarcity," admits that the new
technologies driving the shift to abundance "require[] physical inputs
that will in turn be subject to the laws of scarcity." 367 But that very fact
undercuts predictions that such technologies will bring about a post-
scarcity world. The friction of the real only increases as the amount of
requisite physical inputs increases.
These difficulties are magnified further still as to physical inputs
other than ABS plastic, the dominant component of early 3D-printed
objects. Plastic is uniquely inexpensive to produce and (because of its
light weight) transport; it also melts at very low (and therefore rela-
tively safe) temperatures. These qualities make plastic the offline ana-
logue of information-centric products. But other common
manufacturing components exhibit inherent attributes that render
them much less practical for 3D-printing applications. The costs of
producing and transporting steel, glass, and the like are-and will nec-
essarily remain-quite high relative to those entailed by plastic. Such
materials also melt at temperatures well above plastic's melting
point-3200oF for glass, 25000 F for steel, etc.-increasing both the en-
ergy required for, and the relative danger involved in, production.368
363 See, e.g., Raymond, supra note 157.
364 Id.
365 See RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 15 ("[T]he core of the [Internet of Things] . . . is the
coming together of the Communications Internet, Energy Internet, and Logistics Internet in a
cohesive operating platform.").
366 Frischmann, supra note 160.
367 Lemley, supra note 17, at 502.
368 Eric Bank, Temperature Needed to Turn Silicon into Glass, SEATTLE Pi, http://education
.seattlepi.com/temperature-needed-turn-silicon-glass-3715.html [https://perma.cc/ZBK5-TSW8];
Brian Kross, What's the Melting Point of Steel, JEFFERSON LAB, https://education.jlab.org/qa/
meltingpointOl.html [https://perma.cc/Z9W8-7N9U]. More exotic materials demand equally ex-
otic temperatures-tungsten, for example, melts at 6177 0 F. Periodic Table: Tungsten, ROYAL
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Unsurprisingly, then, Rifkin's references to the world's first "3D-
printed automobile" minimized the importance of the vehicle's engine
and frame, which were manufactured using traditional processes.369
Plastic is uniquely well suited to 3D-printing applications, but the fric-
tion of the real increases as other inputs are used.
Some proponents of the Myth of Free point to the rise of the so-
called "sharing economy" as a vital component of real-world Free. We
are told that services like Airbnb, Uber, and Zipcar will give rise to a
"new collaborative economy"370 that will replace "conventional capi-
talist market[s]" in ten to thirty percent of the global marketplace 371 -
or even bring about "the end of capitalism as we know it."372 This
vision is, at best, misguided.3 73 In fact, such services are, at their core,
capitalistic: they function by allowing owners to convert consumer
goods into capital goods-in other words, to become capitalists. 374 The
usage of such capital goods entails depreciation costs, which owners
must recoup, at present via charging positive prices.375 Efficient
though sharing-economy services may be, 37 6 the friction of the real
prevents their being or becoming Free.
All of this suggests that the Myth of Free grows ever more tenu-
ous as it spreads to offline markets. Abundance will remain the excep-
tion, rather than the rule, even in developed economies. This is the
scarcity of abundance.
Soc'Y CHEMISTRY, http://www.rsc.org/periodic-table/element/74/tungsten [https://perma.cc/
3GDF-APGG].
369 RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 98-99; see also Joe Bargmann, Urbee 2, the 3D-Printed Car that
Will Drive Across the Country, POPULAR MECHANICS (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.popu-
larmechanics.com/cars/a9645/urbee-2-the-3d-printed-car-that-will-drive-across-the-country-1611
9485/ [https://perma.cc/D2NJ-PLPL].
370 Chase, supra note 57.
371 SOLANGE LE JEUNE, THE SHARING EcONOMY 5 (2016), http://www.schroders.comlen/
sysglobalassets /digital/insights / 2016 / pdfs / responsible - investment/ the - sharing - economy/ the -
sharing-economy-report-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XT5-EMC5]; RIFKIN, supra note 11, at
310-11; see also id. at 16 (predicting "the shrinking of capitalism in the next half-century and the
rise of a Collaborative Commons as the dominant model for organizing economic life").
372 Chase, supra note 57.
373 See Rampell, supra note 56 (suggesting the sharing economy is "no different from tradi-
tional commerce").
374 See SLEE, supra note 55, at 10.
375 See supra Section III.B.2. The "sharing economy" may well continue to place some
downward pressure on the price of hotel rooms, ground transportation, etc. See SLEE, supra note
55, at 10. But it does not represent a Free-or even zero-price-alternative.
376 E.g., Arun Sundararajan, From Zipcar to the Sharing Economy, HARV. Bus. REV. (Jan.
3, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/01/from-zipcar-to-the-sharing-eco [https://perma.cc/KL76-Y445].
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3. Completing the Dynamic View: Demand as a Moving Target
The proponents of the Myth of Free frame their position as dy-
namic and forward looking, in opposition to the static and regressive
views held by Free's detractors. Lemley heralds "a raft of new tech-
nologies" that will "challenge . . . the basis for our economy as a
whole," while noting that "[t]he prospect of that reshaping has caused
many to worry." 3 7 7 Another commentator depicts those experiencing
such worry as motivated by a futile retrograde impulse: "1990 isn't
going to come back.. .. Trying to protect a system that's now funda-
mentally broken is like trying to reroute a raincloud to go and thun-
derstorm over a different town." 3 78 In Free, Anderson describes, "[a]t
risk of ageist generalization," a generation of "older critics, who
ha[ve] grown up with twentieth-century Free" and are wrongly "suspi-
cious" of Free products. 379 These "older critics" stand in sharp contrast
to the younger "Google Generation," which has "grown up online
simply assuming that everything digital is free."38 0
But those who foresee a coming age of abundance tend to miss-
or misunderstand-a crucial element of the dynamic, long-run view:
demand is a moving target.381 With that element in place, such techno-
optimism is revealed as misguided. It is, as those who espouse the
Myth of Free rightly recognize, a mistake to view technological inno-
vation solely through the lens of short-run employment effects. 38 2
Gutenberg's invention of the printing press increased unemployment
among the trained scribes whose livelihoods depended on demand for
handwritten copies.3 83 From the static, short-run viewpoint of a scribe,
377 Lemley, supra note 17, at 515.
378 Palmer, supra note 27, at xvii.
379 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 5.
380 Id. This claim is also somewhat at odds with research indicating that "younger consum-
ers ... [alre as concerned about privacy as older consumers." STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 39,
§ 5.14 (citing CHRIS HOOFNAGLE ET AL., How DIFFERENT ARE YOUNG ADULTS FROM OLDER
ADULTS WHEN IT COMES TO INFORMATION PRIVACY ATTITUDES & POLICIES? (2010), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1589864 [https://perma.cc/4Z84-KJ6U]).
381 Even a more moderate claim would suffice here-if demand can be a moving target,
then analysts who ignore that possibility still proceed in error. It may not be the case that inno-
vation (or shifting taste, etc.) causes demand to change in every product market; for present
purposes, however, it is enough that innovation et al. may do so.
382 See, e.g., James Surowiecki, Gross Domestic Freebie, NEW YORKER (Nov. 25, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/11/25/gross-domestic-freebie [https://perma.cc/756Q-
4DY2] ("The G.P.S. company Garmin was once one of the fastest-growing companies in the U.S.
Thanks to Google and Apple Maps, Garmin's sales have taken a severe hit, but consumers, who
now have access to good directions at no cost, are certainly better off.").
383 See Mike Masnick, A Fifteenth Century Technopanic About the Horrors of the Printing
Press, TECHDIRT (Feb. 25, 2011, 7:39 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110119/050229127
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Gutenberg's innovation was harmful. From a broader, dynamic per-
spective, however, overall societal welfare greatly increased, and new
types of employment were created to replace the old.
But it is also mistaken to extrapolate a post-scarcity world based
on current levels of demand for products as those products are cur-
rently configured and delivered. 38 4 To illustrate, consider corn, which
Anderson points to as an example of a presently abundant product. 85
Beginning in the 1920s, agricultural innovations began to sharply in-
crease annual yield rates of corn. 386 With the growth of corn yield
rates outstripping population growth-and assuming only then-ex-
isting uses for the crop-the end of food scarcity may have seemed in
sight.3 87
Such an approach to forward-looking economic analysis exhibits
a fatal flaw: it takes a dynamic view of supply, but a static stance to-
ward demand. 388 Increases in corn production have not ended hunger.
Instead, an unforeseen innovation-ethanol-dramatically increased
demand, 389 such that conversion to fuel in 2015-2016 accounted for
38.1% (5.2 billion bushels) of domestic U.S. corn usage.390 Beyond
ethanol, corn is now also used to produce plastics, cosmetics, infant
25/fifteenth-century-technopanic-about-horrors-printing-press.shtml [https://perma.cc/KR7X-
A9RG].
384 Cf Jose Cuesta, Resource Scarcity from an Applied Economic Perspective, 42 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 11, 18 (2013) ("[T]he critical connection between physical scarcity and margi-
nal returns has been dominated by supply considerations alone. But an economic analysis of
scarcity naturally requires a demand angle as well. . . . Scarcity or shortage thus becomes funda-
mentally an economic circumstance not only determined by physical availability, but also by
factors as disparate as logistics and preferences.").
385 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 47. For another example, consider sand. Christensen and
van Bever posit that sand is an "abundant and cheap" resource, and that "[w]e don't need to
account for such inputs and can waste them." Christensen & van Bever, supra note 21, at 64. This
viewpoint is likely not shared by those from whose land sand is extracted-in fact, the scarcity of
sand has led to widespread ecological damage, government bans on mining, and even murder.
Vince Beiser, The Deadly Global War for Sand, WIRED (Mar. 26, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www
.wired.com/2015/03/illegal-sand-mining/ [https://perma.cc/4KJL-BK4H].
386 Brad Plumer, A Brief History of U.S. Corn, in One Chart, WASH. PosT (Aug 16,2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/08/16/a-brief-history-of-u-s-com-in-one-
chart/ [https://perma.cc/5K3S-2GD5].
387 Perhaps coincidentally, it was in 1930 that Keynes declared the end of scarcity to be
within humankind's reach. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchil-
dren (1930), in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 358 (Norton Library 1963) (1932).
388 Or perhaps as to supply-side innovation-the two are inextricably intertwined.
389 That demand was increased in part by government subsidies. See Background, U.S.
DEP'T AGRIC.: ECON. RES. SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/corn/background.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6XK3-LH67] ("Government programs have been instrumental in the develop-
ment of the . . . fuel alcohol market[].").
390 U.S. Bioenergy Statistics, U.S. DEP'T AGRIc.: ECON. RES. SERv., https://www.ers.usda
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diapers, binders in medications, textiles, adhesives, etc. 39 1 A holistic
dynamic view contemplates demand as a moving target.392
Digital streaming video has followed a similar trajectory. Rapidly
declining bandwidth costs are an integral part of Free's mythology.393
And Free's mythologists often point to digital streaming video as an
example of abundance. 394 In 2005, when popular video-sharing service
YouTube was launched, the age of bandwidth abundance likely
seemed imminent-at least assuming that then-prevailing video reso-
lution and size remained constant over time.
That assumption would have been incorrect. Bandwidth costs
have declined, and continue to decline, rapidly over time.3 95 "[B]ut,
importantly, these cost declines are often offset by increases in aver-
age video file size, as resolution increases." 396 This dynamic helps to
explain why YouTube, despite years of growth, remained unprofita-
ble.397 Much like the development of ethanol increased the demand
for corn, the advent of high-definition video increased the demand for
bandwidth. The development and diffusion of innovations-3D televi-
sion, holographic audiovisual content, etc.-will continue this trend.39 8
Like demand for corn, bandwidth demand is a moving target.
.gov/data-products/us-bioenergy-statistics/us-bioenergy-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/7VLA-
ELNH] (last updated Apr. 5, 2018) (Table 5).
391 Jared Cummans, What Is Corn Used for? 13 Surprising Uses of Corn, COMMODrrYHQ
(June 24, 2015), http://commodityhq.com/investing-ideas/13-ways-corn-is-used-in-our-everyday-
lives/ [https://perma.cc/DR5C-54P3].
392 Anderson depicts the price effects of ethanol as a temporary impediment to corn's
abundance, one that will soon be eliminated by innovation in producing ethanol from other plant
matters. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 48. Overlooked in the analysis are the long-run costs im-
posed by corn production, including the erosion of topsoil and nutrients, pollution, and destruc-
tion of native habitats. See MARY HARRIS & GEETHA IYER, SMALL CHANGES, BIG IMPACTS:
PRAIRIE CONSERVATION STRIPS (2014), https://www.extension.iastate.edu/alternativeag/info/
Small%20Changes%2OBig%2OImpacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2M7-C5GC] ("[O]ver half of the
prairie-built topsoil of Iowa has been lost in the past 50 years, along with nutrient runoff and
pollution of waterways.").
393 E.g., ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 13; RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 206.
394 ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 195; JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL COST Soci-
ETY: THE INTERNET OF THINGS, THE COLLABORATIVE COMMONS, AND THE ECLIPSE OF CAPI-
TALISM 205-06,213 (paperback ed. 2015) (calling YouTube an "open Commons"); Lemley, supra
note 17, at 485-86 ("The rise of sites like YouTube has led to an astonishing outpouring of videos
from outside Hollywood .... ).
395 Blodget, supra note 97.
396 Id. (emphasis omitted).
397 See supra Section II.A.1.a.
398 See Miles O'Brien, Forget HD-Hologram Television May Be Closer than You Think,
Bus. INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2015, 11:06 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/hologram-television-
technology-is-near-2015-10 [https://perma.cc/G9H6-EONZI ("[T]ransmitting a hologram . . .
takes a huge amount of bandwidth and power.").
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In 1930, Keynes published Economic Possibilities for Our
Grandchildren.3 99 This short essay predicted that the end of scarcity
would arrive within one hundred years; all that was required was a
sevenfold increase in the size of the global economy.400 Since 1930,
though, gross domestic product has risen sixteenfold-and still, scar-
city prevails. 4 0 1 Keynes turns out to have been pessimistic on growth
rates, yet optimistic on the prospect of a post-scarcity society. The cul-
prit is a forecast that was only half dynamic: Keynes failed to account
for demand as a moving target. Perhaps it is the case that "[a]fter an
initial period of excitement, the average consumer grows accustomed
to what he has purchased, and . . . rapidly aspires to own the next
product in line." 40 2 At any rate, it is a mistake to view supply and
demand separately. Supply-side innovation often triggers increased
demand. As a result, a truly dynamic view must account for demand
as a moving target, rather than a static constant. Failure to do so re-
sults in misguided forecasts of a zero-marginal-cost, post-scarcity
society.
IV. THE DANGERS OF MYTHOLOGIZING FREE
Myths matter. Apologist and critic C.S. Lewis describes the
human experience of receiving myth: "It is as if something of great
moment had been communicated to us." 4 0 3 In the same vein, Laura
Miller argues that the unique attraction to mythology exists at least in
part because myths are "stories that transform the world-and our-
selves." 404 Myths do not exist in a vacuum. On the contrary, the capac-
ity of myth to change thought and, ultimately, motivate action makes
mythology a potent, dynamic part of the social sphere. But the power
of myth portends danger as well as delight. As to policy advocacy,
where mythos is substituted for logos, the resulting prescriptions will
be unsound. And, when implemented, myth-based policies present
both serious deontological concerns and the strong likelihood of per-
nicious (if unintended) consequences.
399 KEYNES, supra note 387.
400 Id. at 363-65.
401 Elizabeth Kolbert, No Time, NEW YORKER (May 26, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2014/05/26/no-time [https://perma.cc/Y63Y-G7CJ].
402 Gary S. Becker & Luis Rayo, Why Keynes Underestimated Consumption and Overesti-
mated Leisure for the Long Run, in REVISITING KEYNES Economic Possibilities for Our
Grandchildren 179, 182 (Lorenzo Pecchi & Gustavo Piga eds., 2008).
403 C.S. LEWIS, AN EXPERIMENT IN CRITICISM 44 (1961).
404 Laura Miller, Why Myths Still Matter, SALON (Nov. 16, 2005, 8:00 AM), http://www
.salon.com/2005/11/16/myths_4/ [https://perma.cc/H9YX-V8XY].
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The Myth of Free poses at least three such dangers. First, and
most concretely, judicial and regulatory institutions have already
granted a unique protected (i.e., either immunized or advantaged) sta-
tus to suppliers of Free products. But that protected status, based in
myth instead of reality, is undeserved. As such, it constitutes an un-
warranted deviation from the relevant rules, thereby undercutting
fundamental tenets of modern legal traditions and the rule of law. It
also inefficiently distorts natural market competition, thereby reduc-
ing societal welfare.
Second, prominent economists have argued that the market para-
digm is inappropriate in the face of Free products. But even if markets
are not an optimal distributive mechanism, arguments attempting to
discredit them should be based in fact, rather than myth. Third, lead-
ing legal scholars have urged the explicit reshaping-or even elimina-
tion-of entire legal regimes in response to the Myth of Free. Yet, at
least assuming those regimes currently yield some net value to society,
their alteration or elimination would decrease societal welfare.
Fourth, governments responding to the Myth of Free may more
broadly shape national or international policies in anticipation of an
age of abundance that is (supposedly) either already upon us or soon
to arrive-despite the impossibility of "Free" ever becoming true
Free. That misguided focus, particularly when coupled with the
techno-deterministic sense of inevitability that often accompanies the
Myth of Free,405 would almost certainly cause institutional actors to
neglect the persistent scarcity faced by vast populations.
A. Granting an Undeserved "Protected Status"
In a variety of contexts, U.S. legal institutions have impliedly or
expressly granted a unique protected status to suppliers of Free prod-
ucts. The following discussion comprises two parts. The first is purely
descriptive; it identifies several areas of law wherein a Free-based pro-
tected status has been granted. The second is normative; it evaluates
whether that protected status is justified as a policy matter. 4 0 6
The common law of contracts yields multiple examples of Free-
based protected status. Courts adjudicating breach of contract claims
405 See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 27, at xvii; cf MATTHEw B. CRAWFORD, THE WORLD BE-
YOND YOUR HEAD: ON BECOMING AN INDIVIDUAL IN AN AGE OF DISTRACTION 221 (2015)
(referring to "techno-inevitability" as "a readiness to regard technology as a force with its own
magical imperatives, rather than as an instrument of human intentions").
406 This Article takes the position that "judges, like their counterparts in the legislative
branch, are political agents embodying social policy in law." Paul v. Nat'l Life, 352 S.E.2d 550,
551 (W. Va. 1986).
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have repeatedly placed a thumb on the scales in favor of Free suppli-
ers. This favorable treatment, granted by sole virtue of the fact that
those firms were supplying Free products, has comprised both re-
jecting unconscionability defenses and enforcing exculpatory clauses.
In Darnaa, LLC v. Google, Inc. ,407 for example, a district court
placed great weight on the fact that the defendant offered a Free ser-
vice.408 Darnaa involved a breach of contract claim against YouTube.
The plaintiff, an independent record label, alleged that it had
uploaded a music video to YouTube's platform after agreeing to You-
Tube's terms of service, and that YouTube breached that agreement
by later removing the video.40 9 In response to Google's motion to dis-
miss, the plaintiff raised the defense of unconscionability.410 The dis-
trict court granted Google's motion, holding that "[b]ecause YouTube
offers its hosting services at no charge, it is reasonable for YouTube to
retain broad discretion over those services and to minimize its expo-
sure to monetary damages." 4 1 1
In Song Fi, Inc. v. Google Inc. ,412 which involved a similar factual
background, the court likewise rejected a plaintiff's unconscionability
defense. 4 1 3 The court, quoting the defendant's brief, stated that "[t]he
provisions ... in the Terms of Service 'make it possible for YouTube
to provide video hosting services for free to hundreds of millions of
users around the world."' 4 1 4 Thus, the court concluded, "[h]aving
taken advantage of YouTube's free services, Plaintiffs cannot com-
plain that the terms allowing them to do so are unenforceable." 4 15
Turning to the enforceability of exculpatory clauses, Lewis v.
YouTube, LLC41 6 provides another instance of favorable treatment
for a Free supplier. 4 1 7 There, the defendant's contract contained a
blanket limitation of liability for "loss or damage of any kind" in-
curred as a result of using the defendant's Free service.418 Again, the
407 No. 15-cv-03221-RMW, 2015 WL 7753406 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2015).
408 Id. at *2-3, *5.
409 Id. at *1.
410 Id. at *2 ("Specifically, plaintiff points to the terms that 1) grant defendants discretion
over content and services, 2) limit defendants' liability, and 3) shorten the statutory limitations
period for claims, as unconscionable.").
411 Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
412 72 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2014).
413 Id. at 61.
414 Id. at 64 (quoting Def. Mem. 11).
415 Id.
416 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 219 (Ct. App. 2015).
417 Id. at 224.
418 Id.
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court granted a motion to dismiss, reasoning that "[1]imitation of lia-
bility clauses . . . are appropriate when one party is offering a service
for free to the public." 419
Consumer-protection and privacy laws are another area in which
Free suppliers have received protected legal status. In In re Facebook
Privacy Litigation,4 2 0 users sued the Free social-networking service
Facebook, alleging that Facebook had violated state consumer protec-
tion laws by sharing users' personal information with third-party ad-
vertisers.421 The district court first dismissed claims based on
California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") reasoning that
"[bjecause Plaintiffs allege that they received Defendant's services for
free, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs cannot state a UCL claim." 4 22 The
court then went on to dismiss claims based on California's Consumers
Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"): because "[a] violation of the CLRA
may only be alleged by a consumer," it followed that "it is not possible
for Plaintiffs to state a claim pursuant to the CLRA." 4 2 3
Antitrust law yields additional illustrations. In the wake of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,424 the U.S. Department of Justice
("DOJ") reviewed dozens of mergers and acquisitions involving
broadcast radio markets.425 Yet "the DOJ considered their economic
impact solely with respect to advertisers and the rates they paid,"
neglecting to consider the impact to listeners. 4 26 More overtly, a dis-
trict court dismissed a tying claim that involved online search, holding
that a "tying arrangement cannot exist when the tying product is not
sold to the consumer, but is provided free of charge." 4 2 7
These departures from rules of general applicability are unwar-
ranted. "The principle of 'treating like things alike' is 'an idea of great
resonance for law (equal justice under law, equal protection of the
419 Id. (emphasis added).
420 791 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
421 Id. at 714.
422 Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
423 Id. at 717.
424 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
425 See Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Why More Antitrust Immunity for the Media
Is a Bad Idea, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1399, 1411 (2011).
426 See id.; see also Newman, supra note 184, at 191. Under one view, this neglect was due
more to DOJ recognizing its institutional inability to analyze Free markets with the desired level
of precision than to DOJ embracing the Myth of Free. Of course, from a consequentialist per-
spective, the distinction would be immaterial.
427 Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 991 (4th Cir. 1990), affg
713 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Va. 1989).
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laws, equality before the law, one law for rich and poor, and so
forth)."' 428 Deviations from that ideal violate a "fundamental sense of
justice." 4 2 9 Thus, for example, Justice Scalia observed that "[t]he
Equal Protection Clause epitomizes justice more than any other provi-
sion of the Constitution." 4 3 0
Immunity from general laws, it follows, ought to be granted only
where some competing policy consideration provides overwhelming
justification for doing so. It goes nearly without saying that any such
justification ought to be grounded in fact, not in falsehood. 4 3 1 Yet the
protected status for Free suppliers is based not in reality, but upon the
Myth of Free. Contrary to the Lewis court's understanding, YouTube
does not, in fact, offer its services "for free to the public." 4 32 YouTube
offers its services to the public in exchange for licenses to display and
distribute users' video content433 and for viewers' attention to adver-
tisements.434 A blanket waiver of liability may well be appropriate for
a charitable organization that is, in fact, offering a service "for free to
the public," because in at least some settings, such an organization will
take in no direct revenues to offset its potential liability. But YouTube
is subject to no such limitation; it reaps billions of dollars in annual
revenues as a direct result of its exchanges with users and viewers. 43 5
Likewise, there is no principled reason to grant de facto antitrust im-
munity to for-profit broadcast radio suppliers but not (for example) to
for-profit satellite radio suppliers-a lessening of competition may
harm listeners in either type of market.4 36
Moreover, such special treatment necessarily advantages certain
firms over others. Legal institutions that grant an undeserved pro-
tected status to Free suppliers thus disrupt the natural functioning of
428 Newman, supra note 111, at 58 (quoting RicHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF Ju-
RISPRUDENCE 42 (1990)).
429 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1178
(1989).
430 Id.
431 It is worth noting that the argument here depends for additional force on a classically
conservative attitude toward existing regulatory regimes.
432 But see Lewis v. YouTube, LLC, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 219, 224 (Ct. App. 2015).
433 See Terms of Service, YouTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms
[https://perma.cc/XXW9-KSVM].
434 See You Tube Advertising, YouTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/advertise/ [https://per
ma.cc/6KNY-5KQ9].
435 Sam Gutelle, Report: YouTube Generated $4 Billion in Revenue in 2014, TUBEFILTER
(Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.tubefilter.com/2015/02/26/youtube-2014-revenue-four-billion/ [https://
perma.cc/9CVK-3AS3].
436 See Newman, supra note 111, at 58-59.
578 [Vol. 86:513
THE MYTH OF FREE
the marketplace with no normative justification. As a result, that sta-
tus will produce suboptimal economic outcomes.
Exceptions to general rules are sometimes justified. But where
the sole justification in support of a protected status is the Myth of
Free, that status is unwarranted. Granting certain suppliers favorable
legal treatment based on the incorrect premises described above un-
dercuts the rule of law and unjustifiably distorts the natural function-
ing of markets, thereby reducing societal welfare. 4 3 7
B. Overlooking the Ongoing Need for Markets
Policy proposals grounded in the Myth of Free are similarly mis-
guided. In 2001, economists Brad DeLong and Larry Summers pub-
lished an article grappling with the "meaning and importance of the
'new economy.'" 4 3 8 The article's tone is guardedly optimistic; 4 39 the
analysis begins with the fundamental proposition that "[h]igh initial
fixed costs and low, even zero, marginal costs pose difficult questions
but also open up enormous opportunities for economic policy." 4 4 0
That endorsement of true zero marginal costs makes the article an
early exemplar of the Myth of Free informing policy discussions.441
DeLong and Summers point to markets exhibiting a combination
of "[high initial fixed costs and low, even zero, marginal costs" as
tending toward monopoly.44 2 But the inherent inefficiency of monop-
oly, the unsustainability of long-run marginal cost pricing, and the au-
thors' reluctance to "[r]ely[] on government subsidies to cover fixed
set-up costs" combine to force a radical conclusion: "[I]t is clear that
the competitive paradigm cannot be fully appropriate."" 3 In short,
DeLong and Summers springboard from endorsing the Myth of Free
to calling for the end of free markets. And, while that appeal was
framed prescriptively, subsequent analysts have made the obvious
437 See id. at 58-61.
438 DeLong & Summers, supra note 4, at 29.
439 In at least one respect, however, it appears to have been overly optimistic: DeLong and
Summers predicted annual U.S. productivity growth rates of 3%-4%, id. at 30-31, well above
the observed rates in subsequent years. See, e.g., Roberto Cardarelli & Lusine Lusinyan, U.S.
Total Factor Productivity Slowdown: Evidence from the U.S. States (Int'l Monetary Fund, Work-
ing Paper No. 15/116, 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wpl5116.pdf [https://
perma.cc/N5TT-2UKZ].
440 DeLong & Summers, supra note 4, at 48.
441 See, e.g., RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 7-9 (discussing DeLong and Summers's article).
442 DeLong & Summers, supra note 4, at 48-49; see also id. at 34 ("The canonical situation
is more likely to be one of natural monopoly.").
443 Id. at 34.
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leap to descriptivism: under this view, Free does not warrant the end
of markets; Free is the end of markets.4"
Consider the descriptive variation of this argument first. As the
foregoing demonstrates, the marginal costs of the digital products that
underlie the "New Economy" are not-and cannot reach-zero." 5
Free products do not represent the end of markets, nor do they re-
present the end of capitalism. As to the prescriptive argument, the
market system, subject to regulatory corrections of true failures, has
become and remains the dominant means of distribution in developed
economies.44 6 An alternative structure would represent a drastic
deviation from the status quo, and would entail substantial societal
costs in the form of uncertainty and upheaval. Any calls for the adop-
tion of such a structure ought to present a clear accounting of such
costs, as well as a compelling, reality-based demonstration that the
benefits would outweigh those costs. To date, no such reality-based
account has emerged. The Myth of Free does not-and should not-
mean the end of markets.
C. Overlooking the Ongoing Need for Market Interventions
Contemporary technology discourse legitimizes not the inter-
vention of the state in the economy but instead its withdrawal;
not the external managing of the market, but the need of polit-
ics to let the market self-regulate.
-Eran Fisher" 7
The Myth of Free also underlies policy proposals that call for the
relaxation-or outright elimination-of regulatory market interven-
tions. The basic logic is straightforward: true Free eliminates the need
for markets. Where resources become abundant, there is no need for a
market mechanism to facilitate efficient allocation-and therefore no
need for regulatory interventions into marketplace structure and
functioning.
444 See RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 9 (arguing that capitalism will occupy a small sphere in the
"Zero Marginal Cost Society").
445 See supra Sections ILA, II.B.
446 See generally ELEANOR M. Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS ON U.S. ANTITRUST IN
GLOBAL CONTEXT 1 (3d ed. 2012) ("In 1989 and the early 1990s came the collapse of Russian
communism, the fall of the Berlin Wall, liberalization of economies from Chile to Indonesia, and
the Washington Consensus (economic liberalization and free markets as the major means to
economic recovery and well being).").
447 ERAN FISHER, MEDIA AND NEW CAPITALISM IN THE DIGITAL AGE: THE SPIRIT OF NET-
WORKS 79 (2010).
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In their analyses of a predicted (or possible) post-scarcity world,
legal scholars have focused on the ramifications for particular legal
fields: IP and antitrust (or "competition") laws. As to both, calls have
been made for fundamental alterations to, if not outright elimination
of, these laws. Such calls are, however, misguided.
As to IP laws, Lemley foresees that "in a post-scarcity world,
high-cost products will increasingly become the exception, not the
norm. They will be islands of IP-driven content in a sea of content
created without the need for IP."#8 Analysts previously made similar
(though narrower) claims as to copyright (a subset of IP), arguing that
the convergence of digitization and the internet made content "free"
to reproduce and distribute." 9 Lemley conceives of a raft of newer
technologies making physical products similarly "free," with corre-
spondingly broader implications for all of IP.450
Notably, even this post-scarcity world is, in fact, only a partially
post-scarcity world, with certain markets continuing to exhibit high
costs. And the normative conclusions are similarly circumspect: as to
those markets that achieve abundance (i.e., those markets that, "like
search engines[,] . . . enable access . . . for free"451), Lemley does not
call for the abolishment of existing IP laws. Instead, practical solutions
offered include "resist[ing] the tendency to expand IP reflexively to
meet every new technological challenge," 4 5 2 declining to allow IP own-
ers to destroy or modify new technologies,4 53 and facilitating creators'
ability to opt out of IP systems if desired. 454
Yet the argument could easily be co-opted by those predisposed
to favor the complete abolition of IP laws. Calls for such widespread
dismantling of current IP regimes increased in number and volume
since the advent of digitization and the internet455-the same develop-
ments that supposedly birthed Free. Indeed, as early as 2002, one
scholar drew upon the Marginalist Premise ("effectively zero" margi-
448 Lemley, supra note 17, at 506.
449 See, e.g., Newman, supra note 70.
450 See Lemley, supra note 17; see also Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents,
Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1691 (2014).
451 Lemley, supra note 17, at 461.
452 Id. at 507.
453 Id. at 508.
454 Id. at 510.
455 See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEvINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY
6 (2005), http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/generallintellectual/against.htm [https://perma.cc/754F-
SMDQ].
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nal costs of digital distribution and reproduction)45 6 to conclude that
''most artists may in fact be far better off in a world without
copyright. "457
As to competition law, Salil Mehra proposes a vital-though im-
plicitly temporary-role for antitrust law. 4 5 8 Under this view, "we
need antitrust for the transition" from the familiar "economy of scar-
city to the predicted post-scarcity world." 459
Mehra carefully stakes out a position on the descriptive likeli-
hood of a post-scarcity world that is more conservative than Lem-
ley's, 4 60 but the ramifications posited for competition law are more
fundamental. Noting that dominant incumbent firms (and policymak-
ers with whom those firms share their rents) are incentivized to re-
strict innovation,461 Mehra calls for antitrust enforcement to play a
strong role-but, it appears, only in facilitating the transition to a
post-scarcity society. 462 The necessary implication is that, once full
abundance appears, competition law becomes unnecessary.
Others have-invoking the tropes of the Myth of Free-called
explicitly for the antitrust enterprise to grant protected status to sup-
pliers of Free products. Robert Bork, for example, argued against an-
titrust oversight of Free online search providers: "There is no coherent
case for monopolization because a search engine, like Google, is free
to consumers .... "463 Manne and Wright make a similar claim: "From
the point of view of the buyers . . . , these [internet] monopolists are
really pathetic at extracting profits, as most of them give away their
products for free ... ."464 Others would extend this leniency to social-
networking websites. 465 Such claims continue unabated. 46 6
456 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 274 (2002).
457 Id. at 311.
458 See Mehra, supra note 17, at 6.
459 Id.
460 See id. at 5. Predicting the actual likelihood of a post-scarcity world is beyond the scope
of Mehra's thesis, which assumes abundance and proceeds accordingly.
461 Id. at 15-21, 32-35 (describing as examples Apple's conduct at issue in the eBooks anti-
trust litigation and taxi monopolies' behavior toward Uber).
462 Id. at 6.
463 Robert H. Bork, Antitrust and Google, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 6, 2012), http://articles.chicago
tribune.com/2012-04-06/opinion/ct-perspec-0405-bork-20120406_- 1_unpaid-search-results-search-
engines-search-algorithms [https://perma.cc/Q78A-EVZB].
464 Manne & Wright, supra note 229.
465 See, e.g., Catherine Tucker & Alexander Marthews, Social Networks, Advertising, and
Antitrust, 19 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1211, 1211 (2012) ("[I]t is not clear that [such networks']
extraordinary growth has created an antitrust issue. . . . [Clonsumers do not pay for using these
services on most social networking sites.").
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Calls for the elimination of IP and competition law are not new.
The danger here is that the Myth of Free lends greater-though un-
warranted-rhetorical force to such arguments. As discussed above,
true zero-cost Free is impossible.467 A fortiori, there is strong reason
to doubt that even actual, advertising-supported Free will expand
infinitely.468
Both competition and IP laws ought to continue to play a role in
Free markets, at least to the extent such laws are justified as a broader
normative matter. Put another way, the Myth of Free should not moti-
vate the abolition of market regulations. So long as costs persist, prov-
iders must recoup them somehow. Certain types of suppliers may
contribute some types of labor without direct monetary compensation,
whether for social, intrinsic, or other motivations4 69-but the need for
infrastructure, coupled with the advantages that inhere in division of
labor, demand an intermediary.470 That intermediary must recoup its
costs. As a result, so long as the dominant form of cost recoupment
remains the marketplace, antitrust and (more arguably) IP laws 4 7 1
continue to have a congressionally mandated role to play vis-A-vis
such intermediaries. And as to non-socially motivated suppliers, the
theoretical justifications for both antitrust and (as Lemley agrees)472
IP laws remain in place.
As the foregoing analysis indicates, idealized, zero-cost Free is
impossible.473 Calls for the partial or total elimination of IP or anti-
466 See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, Yesterday's Antitrust Laws Can't Solve Today's Problems,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-10-05/
yesterday-s-antitrust-laws-can-t-solve-today-s-problems [https://perma.cc/2WM3-25VX] ("The
major internet companies are a new target of antitrust attention, yet most of them give their
main product away for free.").
467 See supra Part II; see also Mossoff, supra note 191, at 973 ("Of course, contrary to
conventional wisdom about the Internet, digital distribution of millions of scholarly articles pub-
lished year after year is not free . . . ." (footnote omitted)).
468 See supra Section III.B.1.
469 See Lemley, supra note 17, at 488-96 (positing a number explanations for creative out-
puts being offered at zero prices).
470 See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 160; supra Sections III.A.2, IV.B.2.
471 There is a robust scholarly debate over whether copyright law in particular does or
should incentivize only the creation of expressive works, or also the dissemination of such works.
Compare Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 Hous. L. REV.
613 (2014) (creators only), with Jonathan M. Barnett, Copyright Without Creators, 9 REV. L. &
EcoN. 389 (2013) (intermediaries and infrastructure for dissemination). Even Gordon admits,
however, that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the latter is a legitimate
aim. See Gordon, supra, at 613-18.
472 Lemley, supra note 17, at 503 ("The IP laws will continue to exist, and they will provide
a necessary incentive for some forms of creativity.").
473 See supra Part II.
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trust laws that are predicated on the (supposed) realistic possibility of
a zero-marginal-cost society are fundamentally flawed. At least as-
suming that such laws carry net social benefits as currently consti-
tuted,4 7 4 the Myth of Free ought not bring about their demise.
Looking forward, the Myth of Free may also yield policy propos-
als that call for governments to decline to regulate nascent technolo-
gies that seem to-but do not in fact-offer Free products. Silicon
Valley adopts the rhetoric of Free with verve, adopting slogans like
"It's free and always will be" 4 7 5 or neologisms like "ridesharing" that
imply free-as-in-gratis interactions. 4 7 6 But the bulk of these new prod-
ucts are not "genuinely gratis," despite claims to the contrary.477 Be-
cause they are delivered via exchanges that are structurally similar to
those involving traditional, positive-price products, it would be a mis-
take-for similar reasons as noted above concerning Free's protected
status478-to adopt policies that are unduly deferential to Free
suppliers.
D. Failing to Confront the Persistence of Scarcity
Paeans to the Myth of Free often neglect addressing the persis-
tent problems of scarcity: poverty; hunger; lack of access to shelter,
clean water, or healthcare; etc. Delong and Summers provide an early
exception, noting that technology-driven "remarkable opportunities"
are not equally available to all individuals.4 79 But, after proposing
widespread price discrimination as a solution to distributional con-
474 This is, to be sure, an assumption not universally shared.
475 FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com [https://perma.cc/6DAB-KEVQ] ("Sign Up: It's
free and always will be.").
476 Rampell castigates this rhetorical ploy:
At its most benign, calling things "sharing" that are actually no different from
traditional commerce is just empty marketing. It might also crowd out other activi-
ties that used to be done for altruistic purposes (like donating your old clothes to
Goodwill rather than selling them on the Internet, or offering a friend a ride to the
airport instead of charging for the service).
But more perniciously, this semantic sleight of hand has been used to justify
tax evasion and other kinds of law-skirting. Of course you shouldn't have to pay
hotel taxes if you're just "sharing" your home! And of course you shouldn't have to
submit to health-department restaurant inspections if you're just "sharing" your
kitchen with paying customers every night! Or get a taxi medallion or commercial
insurance if you're just "sharing" your car!
Rampell, supra note 56.
477 See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 3.
478 See supra Section IV.A.
479 DeLong & Summers, supra note 4, at 49.
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cerns 4 80 the discussion turns quickly to "[t]he most critical issues":
"those that revolve around intellectual property." 4 81 Others decline
even this passing nod to scarcity and attendant distributional issues. 4 8 2
Yet, "[a]s most of us know, many Americans live with poverty or
financial scarcity." 483 Children and groups that have experienced sys-
temic discrimination are particularly likely to experience poverty.484
Among the fifty largest U.S. cities, five exhibited child-poverty rates
in 2013 that exceeded forty percent; none exhibited rates below twelve
percent.485 These figures obtain in the United States, despite its status
as one of the world's wealthiest nations.48 6
Poverty is a wickedly complex issue. In response, the Myth of
Free posits a simple cause (scarcity) and a simple solution (abun-
dance). Indeed, the solution has supposedly arrived already, or is at
least soon to arrive, in the form of the "Zero Marginal Cost Soci-
ety." 4 87 Here, the proponents of the Myth of Free fall into the trap of
what some call "solutionism" 4 8 8 : the tendency to extol technology-
and the internet in particular-as the simple answer to "all the world's
problems." 489
As a result, Free-based policy decisions will almost certainly
cause policymakers to allocate scarce resources in ways that fail to
address the persistence of scarcity. Such misdirected policies will
cause particular harm, either directly or indirectly, to disadvantaged
populations. More broadly, the resulting allocative inefficiency harms
480 Id. at 50-51.
481 Id. at 51.
482 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 189 (positing "a world where food, shelter, and the
rest of Maslow's subsistence needs are met without having to labor in the fields from dawn to
dusk").
483 Nathalie Martin, Survival in the Face of Scarcity: The Undocumented Immigrant Experi-
ence, 58 ARIz. L. REV. 103, 104 (2016).
484 Id. at 104-05.
485 Thirty-Five Largest U.S. Cities Saw Increase in Child Poverty Rate Between 2005 and
2013, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.aecf.org/blog/thirty-five-largest-us-
cities-saw-increase-in-child-poverty-rate-between/ [https://perma.cc/F4V9-D2DK].
486 Rani Singh, Opinion, The World's Richest Countries, FORBEs (Nov. 8, 2015, 8:50 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ranisingh/2015/11/08/new-study-finds-a-better-way-to-measure-the-
worlds-richest-countries/#317710fb6b82 [https://perma.cc/6LQR-2X3T].
487 See, e.g., RIFKIN, supra note 11, at 9.
488 E.g., Evgeny Morozov, Opinion, The Perils of Perfection, N.Y. TiREs (Mar. 2, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/opinion/sunday/the-perils-of-perfection.html [https://perma
.cc/39ED-LB7D].
489 Eric Schmidt, Address at Zeitgeist Americas 2012: The World Around Us (October
2012), http://transcriptvids.com/v/kUHF43xjMJM.html [https://perma.cc/P79L-4RD7] (speculat-
ing that, for example, Google's language-translation service may end the prospect of "wars, con-
flicts, prejudices, and so forth").
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societal welfare. The allocation of scarce resources-"[a] crucial task
for any community" 490-iS optimally guided not by myth, but by real-
ity. In light of the very real problems of scarcity, devoting resources to
the predicted transition to an age of abundance is indefensible. 4 9 1
CONCLUSION
Myths can offer value to society.492 And, in a vacuum, the Myth of
Free would give little cause for concern. Yet when it becomes the basis
for political and legal decisions, its premises take a pernicious turn.
The Myth of Free may offer an optimistic, even utopian vision of the
future, but that vision remains nothing more than a mirage. What is
needed going forward are not systems designed for an illusory age of
abundance, but realistic prescriptions designed to confront head on
the persistent problems attendant to scarcity.
490 Ofer Grosskopf, Protection of Competition Rules via the Law of Restitution, 79 TEx. L.
REV. 1981, 1983 (2001).
491 Again, the present normative argument is consequentialist, see supra Introduction, and
rests upon a fairly standard economic conception of societal welfare. That is not to say, however,
that misdirecting resources in this manner is suboptimal only from a welfarist perspective-it
may well also be morally wrong. See generally Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 443, 489 ("At her noblest level, a virtuous individual exercises [rational
choice and moral deliberation] for its own sake, for spiritual reasons, or to attain true
happiness.").
492 David Crump, Ten Necessary Myths of Law School, 10 J.L. Soc'v 33, 33 (2009) ("Myths
are important to a society. They produce cohesion, as well as tolerance of dysfunction.").
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